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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148870859,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"skill","callID":"call-b5508d9b-d93d-4313-b69e-66cf1a74aaca","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"name":"security-audit"},"output":"\n# Skill: security-audit\n\n# Security Audit\n\nFind vulnerabilities that violate a real trust boundary, then give owners the source evidence, safe reproduction, priority, and smallest effective fix. This is a defensive, source-first workflow. A candidate without a concrete affected principal, resource, or security outcome is not a confirmed finding.\n\n## Operating modes\n\nThis skill is guidance by default. Loading it does not authorize the complete audit workflow or file creation.\n\n- **Guidance mode**: For security questions, focused reviews, methodology, triage, or investigation of specific findings, use only the relevant parts of this skill. Do not automatically run all six phases, create an output directory, or write audit artifacts. You may launch focused agents when useful; they return results to the current task.\n- **Full audit mode**: Use the complete workflow when the user explicitly asks to audit or pen-test a codebase, asks for a full, comprehensive, or end-to-end security review, or requests report artifacts. Run all six phases and write the files defined below.\n\nIf the request could mean either mode, ask one focused question before creating files or starting the complete workflow.\n\n## Platform terminology\n\nThis skill is agent-neutral:\n\n- **Parent** is the agent that coordinates the run and owns shared state.\n- **Task tool** is the platform's delegation or sub-agent mechanism.\n- **`research` agent** is a delegated agent for focused source exploration and factual verification.\n- **`general` agent** is a delegated agent for broad investigation and bounded local execution.\n- **`subagent_type:`** in a heading names which of these two delegated agent roles runs that work.\n\nUse equivalent platform capabilities while preserving role, write-isolation, prompt, and independence boundaries.\n\n## Universal execution safety\n\nThese rules apply in both operating modes. Source inspection is read-only. Run target-controlled builds, tests, processes, browsers, emulators, fuzzers, and fixture processing only inside an OS-enforced sandbox that provides all of these controls:\n\n- no external network; use only an isolated loopback namespace when the check needs local client/server traffic;\n- an empty environment populated from an explicit allowlist with safe values, with scratch-local `HOME`, temporary directories, and caches;\n- a read-only target and toolchain, with the target-controlled process able to write only inside its assigned `scratch/` directory; and\n- explicit low CPU, memory, process, file-size, disk, and wall-clock limits.\n\nThe agent, outside the target-controlled process, may make a disposable source copy in an assigned `scratch/` directory when a build must write beside source. In guidance mode, do not retain target-controlled files. In full audit mode, only trusted parent-side code may promote the minimum non-secret result to retained `artifacts/` using the procedure under Write isolation. Never expose a retained output directory (other than the agent's own assigned `scratch/`), another agent's directory, the host home directory, credentials, sockets, or shared services to target code. Do not install dependencies or let builds fetch them. Use only tools and dependencies already available locally. If every control cannot be enforced, do not execute target code: report the missing sandbox capability as a needs-validation blocker and give a safe validation plan.\n\nUse dummy principals, fixtures, and secrets. Do not probe deployed endpoints, external services, shared infrastructure, production identities, other users' data, or live control planes. Do not test availability against a live or shared process, publish artifacts, alter releases, spend paid API quota, or continue beyond the minimum local effect needed to establish a defect. If the decisive fact is outside source or the sandboxed fixture, report it as needing validation.\n\n## Full audit setup\n\nIn full audit mode, resolve these values before reconnaissance:\n\n- **Skill directory**: the absolute directory containing this `SKILL.md`.\n- **Target**: the absolute repository root under review.\n- **Repo name**: a stable repository identifier from the directory or local Git remote.\n- **Output directory**: a new writable directory outside the target, defaulting to `~/security-audit-skill//run-`, where `` is the next unused integer. Use a directory inside the target only when the user explicitly selects it and the parent verifies that version control ignores the whole directory. Otherwise stop and request an external path.\n- **Source ref**: the reviewed commit and whether the worktree is dirty. Do not treat unreviewed generated or modified files as another revision.\n\n### Write isolation\n\nThe parent creates and is the only writer of shared run files:\n\n- `run-metadata.json`\n- `architecture.md`\n- `coverage-ledger.json`\n- `findings.json`\n- `REPORT.md`\n- `FINDINGS-DETAIL.md`\n- `NEEDS-VALIDATION.md`\n\nEach hunter or verifier receives a unique root under `/agents//`, with separate `scratch/` and `artifacts/` directories. Canonical agent IDs match `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$` and must not equal a Windows device name such as `con`, `prn`, `aux`, `nul`, `com1` through `com9`, or `lpt1` through `lpt9`. Lowercase IDs prevent case-fold collisions. The agent and every target-controlled process may write only to `scratch/`; retained `artifacts/` is parent-owned, is never exposed to the sandbox, and is writable only by trusted parent-side promotion code. Agents may not change shared files, target source, retained artifacts, or another agent's directory. Do not use `/tmp` or the host home directory as a writable fallback.\n\nBefore execution, the parent opens and retains trusted, non-inheritable directory descriptors for the agent's `scratch/` and `artifacts/` roots, and records an allowlist of expected scratch-relative artifact files plus explicit per-file and cumulative byte limits. Never pass those descriptors to the agent or sandbox. After the sandbox and all its processes terminate, trusted parent-side code promotes each allowlisted file separately:\n\n1. Validate the declared relative path: reject absolute, empty, `.`, `..`, or symlinked components.\n2. Walk each parent component from the retained scratch-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; never reopen by path.\n3. Open the leaf no-follow and nonblocking.\n4. Verify with `fstat` that it is a regular file with link count exactly one and within the recorded per-file and cumulative byte limits.\n5. Enforce those limits again while reading from that descriptor.\n6. Copy exactly the verified size, repeat `fstat`, and reject a changed identity, type, link count, or size.\n7. For the destination, walk every parent component from the retained artifacts-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; require each existing component to be a real directory, and create any missing directory exclusively before reopening and verifying it no-follow.\n8. Create the leaf exclusively without following links, verify that the opened destination is a regular file with link count exactly one, and copy from the verified source descriptor without reopening either path.\n9. Use equivalent race-safe APIs on non-POSIX systems.\n10. Never recursively copy or glob scratch, extract an archive into artifacts, or open or promote a symlink, FIFO, socket, device, directory, hard-linked file, changing file, or file that exceeds its bound.\n11. If any check is unavailable, cannot be enforced, or fails, discard the scratch entry; if it is decisive evidence, retain `needs_validation` with the exact promotion blocker.\n\n[HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md) and [VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md](VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md) carry this procedure as one identical fenced block for hunter and verifier prompts; it states the same rules in the same order as this list.\n\nFor a reproduced check, record the command, exact test input, sandbox limits, and only the allowlisted environment variable names plus safe non-secret values needed to reproduce it. Never capture or copy the ambient environment, inherited variables, credential values, authentication state, or unrelated host paths. Launch from an empty environment rather than trying to redact one after execution.\n\nBefore delegation, the parent writes `run-metadata.json` with at least `run_id`, `repo`, `target`, `source_ref`, `profile`, `scope_paths`, `budget` (null if unset), `execution_policy: \"sandboxed-source-and-local-only\"`, selected companion files, prior-run paths, shared-file owners, and `run_status: \"in_progress\"`. Update metadata only when those facts change; candidate state belongs in the coverage ledger and `findings.json`.\n\n## Full audit planning\n\nThe coverage, prior-run, profile, and budget requirements in this section apply only in full audit mode.\n\n### Coverage and prior runs\n\nNo one pass is complete. Build a deterministic coverage plan before hunting and update it after every agent result. [RECONNAISSANCE.md](RECONNAISSANCE.md) defines the stable coverage units and [HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md) defines coverage-critic waves. The parent alone updates the ledger.\n\nIf prior runs exist, read every compatible `coverage-ledger.json` and `findings.json` before planning the current run:\n\n1. Compare the relevant current source with each prior record and unit. A prior source ref alone is not evidence that a path is unchanged.\n2. Carry a prior `confirmed` record into the current candidate set only when its relevant source and conditions are unchanged and its evidence still meets the current contract. Link it to a current ledger unit seeded `planned`, preserve its fingerprint, exclude only that carried root cause from hunters, and send the carried record through the current final verification path; the Phase 3 verifier that re-checks it becomes that unit's assignment owner and moves it to `candidate`.\n3. When relevant source for a prior `confirmed` record changed, create a current planned revalidation unit. Do not put that record on the hunter exclusion list. It remains confirmed only if current independent validation establishes the current path and result.\n4. Make prior `needs_validation`, `deferred`, `blocked`, `out_of_scope`, and any changed-source unit current work. A still-external `needs_validation` record may be carried only after the current source trace is checked and linked by fingerprint to a current `planned` unit whose verifier re-check supplies its owner and evidence; the record keeps the unresolved blocker. These prior states never suppress a current unit.\n5. A prior same-source covered unit may inform priority, but it remains visible in the current ledger. A prior `rejected` record suppresses only the unchanged failed claim, not coverage of its unit; changed evidence creates current work.\n6. Read the prior profile and scope. A prior `quick` or scoped ledger contributes only its recorded evidence and gaps, never an implied \"rest is fine.\"\n\nIf no prior ledger exists, say so in the final coverage statement. Never imply that one run exhausts the target.\n\n### Run profiles and scope\n\nDuring full audit setup, pick a profile from the user's request or propose one from the target's size and stakes. Record it in `run-metadata.json` (`profile`, `scope_paths`) and state it in the report. The default is `standard`.\n\n- **`quick`** — a bounded pass for small targets, re-runs, or a fast first look. Coarsen ledger units to surface × boundary × attack class (subsystem uses the fixed canonical `profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems` identifier), run exactly one hunter wave followed by exactly one final coverage-critic pass, and use one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification. Do not launch a follow-up hunter wave: record the critic's accepted discoveries and reassignments as `deferred`.\n- **`standard`** — the workflow as written.\n- **`deep`** — for high-stakes or large targets. Split ledger units per subsystem and lifecycle mode, run critic waves to a clean pass, keep candidate validation and final record verification as separate fresh agents, and give `prior_covered_same_source` units an independent second pass.\n\nA **scoped run** audits a subset: named paths, one subsystem, one companion domain, or the diff between two source refs. Seed ledger units only for in-scope surfaces and record everything else as `out_of_scope` — never as `covered`. A scoped or `quick` run must present itself as partial coverage.\n\nProfiles change breadth and redundancy, never the evidence bar. Do not scale away the candidate gate, the source/local execution boundary, `needs_validation` discipline, schema validation, or independent verification of `confirmed` records.\n\n#### Cost budget\n\nThe ledger makes spend countable: one unit is roughly one hunter assignment, and one surviving candidate is one or two verifier assignments depending on profile. When the user sets a budget — or the parent proposes one for a large target — record `budget` in `run-metadata.json` as a maximum number of agent invocations across all phases.\n\nApply the strict budget gate before launching any reconnaissance agent. Reserve the four baseline reconnaissance calls, one final post-wave critic for `quick` or one post-wave plus one distinct final-clean critic for `standard`/`deep`, and at least one verifier call. Add focused reconnaissance only after repeating this gate for each extra call. If the requested budget cannot fund that minimum, launch no agent: ask for a larger budget, narrower scope, or different profile. If the request remains unchanged, set `run_status: \"incomplete\"` with `incomplete_reason: \"budget_cannot_fund_reconnaissance_and_reserves\"` and report that no audit pass ran.\n\nSpend it in this order:\n\n1. Count reconnaissance, every post-wave critic, and the separate final-clean critic as agent invocations.\n2. **Reserve critics and validation before hunting.** For `quick`, reserve its one post-wave final critic. Before every `standard` or `deep` hunter wave, reserve one immediate post-wave critic plus one distinct final-clean critic. Also reserve verifier cost from the profile (about 1 or 2 agents per expected candidate; when in doubt reserve 30% of the balance after critic reservation). Never assign hunters into either reserve.\n3. Assign hunters to units in priority order until the hunting allowance is spent. Spend the reserved post-wave critic immediately after that wave; keep the final-clean and validation reserves intact.\n4. Before a later wave, reserve its new post-wave critic again. If the remaining budget cannot cover the required critic calls and validation reserve, launch no hunters from that wave, mark its planned units `deferred` with reason `budget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation`, and use the retained final-clean critic to record the resulting gap.\n\nBefore wave 1, update the pre-recon estimate with seeded units, implied hunter count, mandatory critic calls, validation reserve, and whether the remaining budget covers the plan. If it clearly cannot, say so and propose either a tighter scope or a coarser profile instead of silently thinning evidence. If later facts consume the required final-critic reserve, launch no hunters, mark all planned work deferred, set the run incomplete with reason `critic_budget_exhausted`, and make no complete-coverage claim.\n\nA strict total-agent budget can still be exceeded by an unexpectedly large candidate set or by a material Phase 5 replacement that needs another independent verifier. If the remaining budget cannot validate every candidate, stop hunting, validate candidates in fingerprint order while the budget permits, and set `run_status: \"incomplete\"` plus `incomplete_reason: \"validation_budget_exhausted\"`. Keep each unvalidated fingerprint linked to a `candidate` ledger unit with that unresolved reason. Do not put an unvalidated candidate in `findings.json`, relabel it `needs_validation`, or report the run as complete. Phase 6 may produce a partial report only if its first section states that candidate validation is incomplete and lists the affected fingerprints and units. Never exceed a user-set strict budget silently.\n\n## Core principles\n\n### Require a boundary and result\n\nFor every candidate, name the lower-trust principal, accepted input or action, intended control, crossed boundary, affected principal or resource, and concrete observed or owner-observable result. Do not elevate a missing best practice, guessed deployment behavior, generic parser crash, or self-impact into a security finding.\n\n### Use bounded local evidence\n\nStatic analysis establishes the source path. Sandboxed local tests resolve behavior when all execution controls are available: a minimal function harness, existing unit test, small parser fixture, dummy-tenant integration test, locally rendered configuration, or bounded isolated-loopback client. Stop at a wrong return value, unauthorized dummy record, sanitizer finding, policy difference, or other minimum effect. Do not extend the local check beyond the minimum boundary result or produce persistence, post-fault, or concealment material.\n\n### Respect source visibility\n\nDeployment controls, proxy behavior, provider settings, browser headers, identity policy, broker ACLs, packaging, and topology are real controls. If they are required and absent from the repository, do not assume either presence or absence. Use `needs_validation` with the exact missing fact and a safe owner-observed or local plan.\n\n### Separate priority from certainty\n\nOnly `confirmed` records receive severity. Likelihood and impact must reflect the demonstrated conditions and result; overall severity cannot exceed demonstrated impact. `needs_validation` means a specific source-grounded boundary hypothesis is blocked, not a low-confidence confirmed vulnerability, and it has no severity.\n\nCalibrate overall severity with these anchors:\n\n- **critical** — an unauthenticated actor gains code execution, full data-store access, or takeover of arbitrary accounts.\n- **high** — an actor fully defeats an explicit security control with real consequences: authentication bypass, cross-tenant read or write, stored script execution affecting other users, authenticated code execution, or an unauthenticated remote stop of a shared service.\n- **medium** — a real boundary violation with limited blast radius, uncommon preconditions, or consequences confined to a narrow resource set.\n- **low** — disclosure of non-secret internals, or an effect requiring sustained effort for minimal gain.\n- **informational** — a confirmed but minimal-impact observation, useful mainly as a prerequisite inside a larger finding.\n\nThe high/medium discriminator: does the demonstrated result fully defeat an explicit control for an action with real consequences, or only weaken it? If you cannot state the concrete damage, the severity is lower than it feels.\n\n### Recommend the smallest effective source fix\n\nFor each confirmed finding, identify the invariant the code must enforce and the narrowest source change that enforces it at the last trusted decision point. Prefer specific repository-relative changes and regression tests over generic hardening advice. The audit describes fixes; it does not modify target source.\n\n## Full audit workflow\n\nIn full audit mode, follow all six phases in order:\n\n1. **Reconnaissance** — map the source, trust boundaries, local build paths, companion selections, prior evidence, and initial deterministic coverage ledger with [RECONNAISSANCE.md](RECONNAISSANCE.md).\n2. **Coverage-led hunting waves** — assign isolated hunters from the ledger and collect structured candidate results with [HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md), [ATTACK-CLASSES.md](ATTACK-CLASSES.md), and the selected domain companions.\n3. **Candidate validation** — consolidate fingerprints and give every candidate to a fresh source verifier as defined in [VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md](VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md).\n4. **Structured output** — write all final `confirmed`, `needs_validation`, and `rejected` records to `findings.json`; validate it with `report-schema.json` and `validate-findings.cjs`, and validate the coverage claim with `validate-coverage-ledger.cjs`.\n5. **Independent record verification** — use fresh agents to verify final source claims and reconcile corrections or state changes.\n6. **Target-neutral report** — derive `REPORT.md`, `FINDINGS-DETAIL.md`, and `NEEDS-VALIDATION.md` from the final records, with no live-probe instructions.\n\nDo not end the run before one of exactly two terminal states: (a) all Phase 6 artifacts are written and both validators pass, or (b) `run_status: \"incomplete\"` is recorded with its exact reason and the gap is disclosed in the report. Never stop mid-phase.\n\n## Anti-patterns\n\n1. Checklist deviations presented as vulnerabilities.\n2. Defense-in-depth advice with no reachable boundary violation.\n3. Live or shared-environment testing where bounded local evidence is insufficient.\n4. Guessing provider, proxy, browser, identity, or deployment behavior not present in source.\n5. Treating intended same-principal authority or self-impact as a cross-boundary result.\n6. Reporting a parser or runtime effect stronger than the observed effect.\n7. Emitting prose-only hunter results that cannot be deduplicated or verified.\n8. Re-reporting carried same-source prior confirmed records or using them as exemplars that anchor the hunt.\n9. Assigning severity to `needs_validation` records.\n10. Writing the report before independent verification or letting prose and JSON disagree.\n\nBase directory for this skill: file:///workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit\nRelative paths in this skill (e.g., scripts/, reference/) are relative to this base directory.\nNote: file list is sampled.\n\n\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/report-schema.json\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.test.cjs\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/ATTACK-CLASSES.md\n/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/RECONNAISSANCE.md\n\n","metadata":{"name":"security-audit","dir":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit","truncated":false},"title":"Loaded skill: security-audit","time":{"start":1793148870832,"end":1793148870854}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The user wants me to run a full security audit of the codebase using the security-audit skill. Let me first load the skill to understand the workflow, then execute it according to the parameters given:\n- Profile: quick\n- Budget: at most 12 agent invocations\n- Output directory: /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1\n- No OS-enforced sandbox\n- Work non-interactively\n\nLet me start by loading the skill.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800060a5001rgZXOdmfj6tvbT","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180004d1c001agnJk9c3P0s0r1"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148879336,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-1a4b3f73-ec8f-458b-bf7e-fa0e6482e27e","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"ls -la /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app","description":"List app directory contents"},"output":"total 12\ndrwxr-xr-x 2 box box 4096 Oct 28 08:54 .\ndrwxr-xr-x 5 box box 4096 Oct 28 08:54 ..\n-rw-r--r-- 1 box box 0 Oct 28 08:54 __init__.py\n-rw-r--r-- 1 box box 2895 Oct 28 08:54 server.py\n","metadata":{"output":"total 12\ndrwxr-xr-x 2 box box 4096 Oct 28 08:54 .\ndrwxr-xr-x 5 box box 4096 Oct 28 08:54 ..\n-rw-r--r-- 1 box box 0 Oct 28 08:54 __init__.py\n-rw-r--r-- 1 box box 2895 Oct 28 08:54 server.py\n","exit":0,"description":"List app directory contents","truncated":false},"title":"List app directory contents","time":{"start":1793148879332,"end":1793148879335}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Let me explore the app directory to understand the codebase we're auditing.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800081d8001tls7X8SNQr7SPu","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180007afc001GVTVw2NjLge4xe"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148895133,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-26fbf701-3cf9-447c-bf65-1ec27e00d7e7","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app/server.py"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app/server.py\nfile\n\n1: \"\"\"Tiny notes service (stdlib only). Run: python -m app.server\"\"\"\n2: import json, os, sqlite3\n3: from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n4: from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n5: \n6: DB = os.environ.get(\"NOTES_DB\", \"notes.db\")\n7: FILES_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.environ.get(\"NOTES_FILES\", \"files\"))\n8: SESSIONS = {} # token -> user_id, filled by /login\n9: \n10: \n11: def db():\n12: return sqlite3.connect(DB)\n13: \n14: \n15: def current_user(handler):\n16: token = handler.headers.get(\"X-Session\", \"\")\n17: return SESSIONS.get(token)\n18: \n19: \n20: def search_notes(user_id, term):\n21: # Full-text-ish search over the caller's notes.\n22: q = \"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\" % (user_id, term)\n23: return db().execute(q).fetchall()\n24: \n25: \n26: def get_note(user_id, note_id):\n27: return db().execute(\n28: \"SELECT id, title, body FROM notes WHERE id = ? AND owner = ?\", (note_id, user_id)\n29: ).fetchone()\n30: \n31: \n32: def delete_note(note_id):\n33: con = db()\n34: con.execute(\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ?\", (note_id,))\n35: con.commit()\n36: \n37: \n38: def read_attachment(name):\n39: path = os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name)\n40: with open(path, \"rb\") as f:\n41: return f.read()\n42: \n43: \n44: def read_avatar(name):\n45: path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, \"avatars\", name))\n46: if not path.startswith(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, \"avatars\") + os.sep):\n47: raise PermissionError(\"bad path\")\n48: with open(path, \"rb\") as f:\n49: return f.read()\n50: \n51: \n52: class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n53: def _send(self, code, obj):\n54: body = obj if isinstance(obj, bytes) else json.dumps(obj).encode()\n55: self.send_response(code)\n56: self.end_headers()\n57: self.wfile.write(body)\n58: \n59: def do_GET(self):\n60: url = urlparse(self.path)\n61: qs = {k: v[0] for k, v in parse_qs(url.query).items()}\n62: user = current_user(self)\n63: if user is None:\n64: return self._send(401, {\"error\": \"login required\"})\n65: if url.path == \"/search\":\n66: return self._send(200, search_notes(user, qs.get(\"q\", \"\")))\n67: if url.path == \"/note\":\n68: return self._send(200, get_note(user, int(qs.get(\"id\", \"0\"))))\n69: if url.path == \"/attachment\":\n70: return self._send(200, read_attachment(qs.get(\"name\", \"\")))\n71: if url.path == \"/avatar\":\n72: return self._send(200, read_avatar(qs.get(\"name\", \"\")))\n73: return self._send(404, {\"error\": \"not found\"})\n74: \n75: def do_POST(self):\n76: url = urlparse(self.path)\n77: qs = {k: v[0] for k, v in parse_qs(url.query).items()}\n78: user = current_user(self)\n79: if user is None:\n80: return self._send(401, {\"error\": \"login required\"})\n81: if url.path == \"/delete\":\n82: delete_note(int(qs.get(\"id\", \"0\")))\n83: return self._send(200, {\"ok\": True})\n84: return self._send(404, {\"error\": \"not found\"})\n85: \n86: \n87: if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n88: HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8090), Handler).serve_forever()\n\n(End of file - total 88 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"\"\"\"Tiny notes service (stdlib only). Run: python -m app.server\"\"\"\nimport json, os, sqlite3\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n\nDB = os.environ.get(\"NOTES_DB\", \"notes.db\")\nFILES_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.environ.get(\"NOTES_FILES\", \"files\"))\nSESSIONS = {} # token -> user_id, filled by /login\n\n\ndef db():\n return sqlite3.connect(DB)\n\n\ndef current_user(handler):\n token = handler.headers.get(\"X-Session\", \"\")\n return SESSIONS.get(token)\n\n\ndef search_notes(user_id, term):","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"app/server.py","time":{"start":1793148895109,"end":1793148895131}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Let me read the server.py file to understand the codebase we're auditing.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18000bf7f001sQjTa2EDV0PaUR","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18000821d0011qVJL7nWJPdoMF"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793148896669,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18000c596001fjZA5nIgfYiJiR","messageID":"msg_18000bfbc001Lb0bvdB97EYbyh","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148899017,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-09a61fe1-e5b7-441e-bd10-8ac6e2353d55","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/README.md"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/README.md\nfile\n\n1: # notes service\n2: Small stdlib HTTP notes API. Every user may only see and change their own notes and attachments.\n\n(End of file - total 2 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# notes service\nSmall stdlib HTTP notes API. Every user may only see and change their own notes and attachments.","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"README.md","time":{"start":1793148899010,"end":1793148899016}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I understand the codebase. It's a tiny notes service written in Python using stdlib only. Let me also check the README to understand the project better.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18000cebd001Rkkqg8TSqLDcHv","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18000bfbc001Lb0bvdB97EYbyh"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793148900455,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18000d4640010kCNOas01Bh2hT","messageID":"msg_18000cf11001tm70rlYXTw7cUU","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148906959,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-0e50572b-156e-4c5a-a718-3e27585a7853","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"mkdir -p /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/agents","description":"Create output directory structure"},"output":"(no output)","metadata":{"output":"(no output)","exit":0,"description":"Create output directory structure","truncated":false},"title":"Create output directory structure","time":{"start":1793148906946,"end":1793148906957}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I have a clear picture of the codebase. It's a simple notes service with:\n\n1. SQL injection vulnerability in `search_notes` function (line 22) - uses string formatting instead of parameterized queries\n2. Insecure direct object reference in `delete_note` function (line 32-35) - doesn't check ownership before deletion\n3. Path traversal vulnerability in `read_attachment` function (line 38-41) - no path validation\n4. Path traversal vulnerability in `read_avatar` function (line 44-49) - has some validation but may be bypassable\n5. Session management using in-memory dictionary - not persistent\n6. No authentication endpoint visible (SESSIONS filled by /login but no /login handler visible)\n\nLet me now set up the full audit workflow. I need to:\n1. Create the output directory\n2. Create run-metadata.json\n3. Run reconnaissance\n4. Run hunting\n5. Validate candidates\n6. Write findings.json\n7. Validate with schemas\n8. Write REPORT.md\n\nLet me start by creating the output directory and run-metadata.json.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18000edac001jNUqzHbFpHuHot","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18000cf11001tm70rlYXTw7cUU"}}
{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1793148906969,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18000edce001Ae7iJIStHAmdyj","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","messageID":"msg_18000cf11001tm70rlYXTw7cUU","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":18621,"input":5338,"output":66,"reasoning":257,"cache":{"write":0,"read":12960}},"cost":0}}
{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793148908755,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18000f4cf001UevDB80Sym8ZR6","messageID":"msg_18000edf7001AitRs7rS6BCMfy","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148909382,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-d2d40719-9a7e-4faa-8dcc-b8d705a5dbd8","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && git log -1 --format=\"%H %s\"","description":"Get current commit hash"},"output":"b0a0ca4510087c799d0bb4519b9636c519b1edae notes service\n","metadata":{"output":"b0a0ca4510087c799d0bb4519b9636c519b1edae notes service\n","exit":0,"description":"Get current commit hash","truncated":false},"title":"Get current commit hash","time":{"start":1793148909378,"end":1793148909380}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me create the run-metadata.json with the required information.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18000f733001nFIpX9JbV70rFt","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18000edf7001AitRs7rS6BCMfy"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148914648,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-8fb6a913-6bf9-4304-a1db-11924bc163ca","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Check if worktree is dirty","command":"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && git status --porcelain"},"output":"(no output)","metadata":{"output":"(no output)","exit":0,"description":"Check if worktree is dirty","truncated":false},"title":"Check if worktree is dirty","time":{"start":1793148914641,"end":1793148914647}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me check if the worktree is dirty.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180010bcb001nFI6UeHyIOqjMq","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18000f76100150sO4mP02stIjJ"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148921319,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-de22111e-82ff-4435-b971-05751abf7369","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/run-metadata.json","content":"{\n \"run_id\": \"run-1\",\n \"repo\": \"notes-service\",\n \"target\": \"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj\",\n \"source_ref\": {\n \"commit\": \"b0a0ca4510087c799d0bb4519b9636c519b1edae\",\n \"dirty\": false\n },\n \"profile\": \"quick\",\n \"scope_paths\": [\"app/server.py\"],\n \"budget\": 12,\n \"execution_policy\": \"sandboxed-source-and-local-only\",\n \"companion_files\": [],\n \"prior_run_paths\": [],\n \"shared_file_owners\": {\n \"run-metadata.json\": \"parent\",\n \"architecture.md\": \"parent\",\n \"coverage-ledger.json\": \"parent\",\n \"findings.json\": \"parent\",\n \"REPORT.md\": \"parent\",\n \"FINDINGS-DETAIL.md\": \"parent\",\n \"NEEDS-VALIDATION.md\": \"parent\"\n },\n \"run_status\": \"in_progress\"\n}"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/run-metadata.json","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/run-metadata.json","time":{"start":1793148921301,"end":1793148921318}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The worktree is clean. Now let me create the run-metadata.json file.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800125cc001QtDQ5lwZQwr33S","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180010bfd001qvrMpDCHVM2aoE"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148937133,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-da2d2016-f178-475a-a12c-2bc49b0e14ad","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"content":"# Architecture Overview\n\n## Target\n- **Repository**: notes-service\n- **Path**: /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj\n- **Language**: Python 3 (stdlib only)\n- **Entry point**: app/server.py\n\n## System Description\nA minimal HTTP notes API server using Python's `http.server` and `sqlite3` standard library modules. The service allows authenticated users to create, search, read, and delete their own notes and attachments.\n\n## Components\n\n### 1. HTTP Server (`app/server.py`)\n- **Framework**: `http.server.HTTPServer` on 127.0.0.1:8090\n- **Handler**: Custom `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` subclass\n- **Endpoints**:\n - `GET /search?q=` - Search notes by title (user-scoped)\n - `GET /note?id=` - Get note by ID (user-scoped)\n - `GET /attachment?name=` - Read attachment file\n - `GET /avatar?name=` - Read avatar file from avatars subdirectory\n - `POST /delete?id=` - Delete note by ID\n\n### 2. Authentication\n- **Mechanism**: Session token via `X-Session` header\n- **Storage**: In-memory `SESSIONS` dictionary (token -> user_id)\n- **Login**: Referenced but not implemented in this file (`SESSIONS` filled by `/login`)\n\n### 3. Data Layer\n- **Database**: SQLite (`notes.db` via `NOTES_DB` env var)\n- **Schema** (inferred):\n - `notes` table: `id`, `title`, `body`, `owner`\n- **Files**: Local filesystem (`FILES_DIR` via `NOTES_FILES` env var, default `./files`)\n - Attachments: direct under `FILES_DIR`\n - Avatars: under `FILES_DIR/avatars/`\n\n### 4. Trust Boundaries\n| Boundary | Lower-Trust Principal | Higher-Trust Resource | Control |\n|----------|----------------------|----------------------|---------|\n| HTTP API | Unauthenticated network caller | User notes/data | Session token check |\n| HTTP API | Authenticated user (user A) | Another user's notes (user B) | `owner` column filter |\n| File read | Authenticated user | Server filesystem | Path join + `startswith` check (avatars only) |\n| SQL query | Authenticated user | Database | Parameterized queries (mostly) |\n\n## Attack Surface\n1. **Search endpoint** - SQL via `q` parameter\n2. **Note endpoint** - SQL via `id` parameter\n3. **Delete endpoint** - SQL via `id` parameter\n4. **Attachment endpoint** - File read via `name` parameter\n5. **Avatar endpoint** - File read via `name` parameter with path validation\n6. **Session handling** - In-memory token validation\n\n## Deployment Context\n- Single-process, single-threaded HTTP server\n- No TLS, no reverse proxy, no WAF\n- SQLite database file on local disk\n- File storage on local disk\n- No rate limiting, no request size limits\n- No input validation beyond type coercion (`int()`)","filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/architecture.md"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/architecture.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/architecture.md","time":{"start":1793148937122,"end":1793148937131}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to create the architecture.md file to document the system architecture.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18001639d001HMgM8FsHfmCz5Z","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18001260d001qY5KlBrKb5vxFz"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793148961066,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-1810aeb7-fdd5-48d5-ac98-71277f556bf2","state":{"status":"error","input":{"description":"Hunt for vulnerabilities in notes service","prompt":"You are a security hunter analyzing the notes service at /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app/server.py.\n\nYour task: Find vulnerabilities that violate a real trust boundary. For each candidate, you must identify:\n1. Lower-trust principal (who attacks)\n2. Accepted input or action (what they control)\n3. Intended control (what should stop them)\n4. Crossed boundary (what they reach)\n5. Affected principal/resource (who/what is harmed)\n6. Concrete observed/owner-observable result (what actually happens)\n\nFocus on these attack classes for this codebase:\n- injection-sql (SQL injection)\n- path-traversal (file path manipulation)\n- idor (insecure direct object reference)\n- auth-bypass (authentication bypass)\n- info-disclosure (information disclosure)\n\nThe codebase is a tiny Python HTTP server with:\n- SQLite database for notes\n- Local file storage for attachments/avatars\n- Session-based auth via X-Session header\n- 5 endpoints: /search, /note, /attachment, /avatar, /delete\n\nOutput format: Return a JSON array of candidate findings. Each candidate must have:\n{\n \"fingerprint\": \"unique stable identifier\",\n \"title\": \"short descriptive title\",\n \"attack_class\": \"one of the above\",\n \"boundary\": \"description of trust boundary crossed\",\n \"principal\": \"lower-trust principal\",\n \"input\": \"attacker-controlled input\",\n \"control\": \"intended control that fails\",\n \"resource\": \"affected resource\",\n \"result\": \"concrete observed result\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [start, end],\n \"snippet\": \"relevant code snippet\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"static\" | \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"how to verify\",\n \"command\": \"optional command to run in sandbox\"\n }\n}\n\nOnly report candidates with concrete boundary violations. Do not report missing best practices, generic crashes, or self-impact.","subagent_type":"research"},"error":"Unknown agent type: research is not a valid agent type","time":{"start":1793148961061,"end":1793148961064}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to run the reconnaissance phase. For a quick profile, I should run exactly one hunter wave followed by one final coverage-critic pass. Let me start by launching a hunter agent to analyze the codebase for vulnerabilities.\n\nSince the budget is 12 agent invocations, and I need to reserve:\n- 1 for reconnaissance (this initial setup)\n- 1 for post-wave critic (required for quick profile)\n- At least 1 for verifier (for each candidate found)\n\nLet me launch a hunter agent to do the analysis. I'll use the task tool to launch a research agent.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18001c11c001pufkrTSPbCczt5","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18001874d001TjMarHsKDZ0d1E"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149058625,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-58dfcc09-4466-4fbe-a671-e59a27605691","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Hunt for vulnerabilities in notes service","subagent_type":"explore","prompt":"You are a security hunter analyzing the notes service at /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app/server.py.\n\nYour task: Find vulnerabilities that violate a real trust boundary. For each candidate, you must identify:\n1. Lower-trust principal (who attacks)\n2. Accepted input or action (what they control)\n3. Intended control (what should stop them)\n4. Crossed boundary (what they reach)\n5. Affected principal/resource (who/what is harmed)\n6. Concrete observed/owner-observable result (what actually happens)\n\nFocus on these attack classes for this codebase:\n- injection-sql (SQL injection)\n- path-traversal (file path manipulation)\n- idor (insecure direct object reference)\n- auth-bypass (authentication bypass)\n- info-disclosure (information disclosure)\n\nThe codebase is a tiny Python HTTP server with:\n- SQLite database for notes\n- Local file storage for attachments/avatars\n- Session-based auth via X-Session header\n- 5 endpoints: /search, /note, /delete, /attachment, /avatar\n\nOutput format: Return a JSON array of candidate findings. Each candidate must have:\n{\n \"fingerprint\": \"unique stable identifier\",\n \"title\": \"short descriptive title\",\n \"attack_class\": \"one of the above\",\n \"boundary\": \"description of trust boundary crossed\",\n \"principal\": \"lower-trust principal\",\n \"input\": \"attacker-controlled input\",\n \"control\": \"intended control that fails\",\n \"resource\": \"affected resource\",\n \"result\": \"concrete observed result\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [start, end],\n \"snippet\": \"relevant code snippet\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"static\" | \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"how to verify\",\n \"command\": \"optional command to run in sandbox\"\n }\n}\n\nOnly report candidates with concrete boundary violations. Do not report missing best practices, generic crashes, or self-impact."},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ffe25deffeeibuEIqLo9IImp (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\nNow I have all the information needed. Here are the concrete trust boundary violations:\n```json\n[\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"SQL Injection in /search endpoint via unsanitized query parameter\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\",\n \"boundary\": \"Authenticated user input crosses into SQL query execution context without parameterization\",\n \"principal\": \"Authenticated user (any valid session holder)\",\n \"input\": \"The 'q' query parameter in GET /search?q=\",\n \"control\": \"Parameterized queries / prepared statements (absent - uses string interpolation)\",\n \"resource\": \"SQLite database (all notes tables, potentially other tables via UNION)\",\n \"result\": \"Attacker can execute arbitrary SQL: read all users' notes, extract schema, modify/delete data, or achieve RCE via SQLite extensions\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [20, 23],\n \"snippet\": \"def search_notes(user_id, term):\\n q = \\\"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\\\" % (user_id, term)\\n return db().execute(q).fetchall()\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"Start server, login to get session, then send SQL injection payload in search query\",\n \"command\": \"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && python -c \\\"import sqlite3; conn=sqlite3.connect('notes.db'); conn.execute('CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notes (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, owner INTEGER, title TEXT, body TEXT)'); conn.execute('INSERT INTO notes (owner, title, body) VALUES (1, 'test', 'secret')'); conn.commit(); print('DB ready')\\\" && python -m app.server & sleep 1 && curl -H 'X-Session: test' 'http://127.0.0.1:8090/search?q=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20id,title%20FROM%20notes%20--' && pkill -f 'app.server'\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"Path Traversal in /attachment endpoint allows arbitrary file read\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\",\n \"boundary\": \"Authenticated user input crosses from web request into local filesystem read outside intended FILES_DIR\",\n \"principal\": \"Authenticated user (any valid session holder)\",\n \"input\": \"The 'name' query parameter in GET /attachment?name=\",\n \"control\": \"Path validation / containment check (absent in read_attachment, present in read_avatar)\",\n \"resource\": \"Server filesystem (any file readable by the server process: /etc/passwd, source code, config files, SSH keys, etc.)\",\n \"result\": \"Attacker reads arbitrary files on the server by providing paths like '../../../etc/passwd'\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [38, 41],\n \"snippet\": \"def read_attachment(name):\\n path = os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name)\\n with open(path, \\\"rb\\\") as f:\\n return f.read()\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"Start server, then request attachment with path traversal payload\",\n \"command\": \"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && python -m app.server & sleep 1 && curl -H 'X-Session: test' 'http://127.0.0.1:8090/attachment?name=../../../../etc/passwd' && pkill -f 'app.server'\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"Insecure Direct Object Reference in /delete endpoint allows deleting any user's notes\",\n \"attack_class\": \"idor\",\n \"boundary\": \"Authenticated user crosses from their own note ownership boundary into other users' note ownership\",\n \"principal\": \"Authenticated user (any valid session holder)\",\n \"input\": \"The 'id' query parameter in POST /delete?id=\",\n \"control\": \"Ownership check in DELETE statement (absent - delete_note only filters by id, not owner)\",\n \"resource\": \"Other users' notes in the database\",\n \"result\": \"Attacker deletes any note by ID regardless of ownership, causing data loss for victim users\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [32, 35, 81, 83],\n \"snippet\": \"def delete_note(note_id):\\n con = db()\\n con.execute(\\\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ?\\\", (note_id,))\\n con.commit()\\n\\n# In do_POST:\\nif url.path == \\\"/delete\\\":\\n delete_note(int(qs.get(\\\"id\\\", \\\"0\\\")))\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"Create notes as two users, then use user A's session to delete user B's note by ID\",\n \"command\": \"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && python -c \\\"import sqlite3; conn=sqlite3.connect('notes.db'); conn.execute('CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notes (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, owner INTEGER, title TEXT, body TEXT)'); conn.execute('DELETE FROM notes'); conn.execute('INSERT INTO notes (owner, title, body) VALUES (1, 'user1 note', 'secret1')'); conn.execute('INSERT INTO notes (owner, title, body) VALUES (2, 'user2 note', 'secret2')'); conn.commit(); print('DB ready - note IDs:', [r[0] for r in conn.execute('SELECT id FROM notes')])\\\" && python -m app.server & sleep 1 && SESSION_A=1 && curl -X POST -H 'X-Session: 1' 'http://127.0.0.1:8090/delete?id=2' && echo 'Deleted note 2 (owned by user 2) using user 1 session' && pkill -f 'app.server'\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"info-disclosure-attachment-path-traversal\",\n \"title\": \"Information Disclosure via Path Traversal in /attachment endpoint\",\n \"attack_class\": \"info-disclosure\",\n \"boundary\": \"Authenticated user input crosses from web request into arbitrary filesystem read, disclosing sensitive server files\",\n \"principal\": \"Authenticated user (any valid session holder)\",\n \"input\": \"The 'name' query parameter in GET /attachment?name=\",\n \"control\": \"Path validation / containment check (absent in read_attachment)\",\n \"resource\": \"Sensitive server files: /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ, application source code, configuration files, SSH keys, database files\",\n \"result\": \"Attacker reads contents of sensitive files on the server filesystem, leading to credential theft, reconnaissance, and further attacks\",\n \"evidence\": {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"lines\": [38, 41, 69, 70],\n \"snippet\": \"def read_attachment(name):\\n path = os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name)\\n with open(path, \\\"rb\\\") as f:\\n return f.read()\\n\\n# In do_GET:\\nif url.path == \\\"/attachment\\\":\\n return self._send(200, read_attachment(qs.get(\\\"name\\\", \\\"\\\")))\"\n },\n \"repro\": {\n \"type\": \"local_test\",\n \"description\": \"Request server source code or /etc/passwd via path traversal in attachment endpoint\",\n \"command\": \"cd /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj && python -m app.server & sleep 1 && curl -H 'X-Session: test' 'http://127.0.0.1:8090/attachment?name=../app/server.py' && echo '' && curl -H 'X-Session: test' 'http://127.0.0.1:8090/attachment?name=../../../../etc/passwd' && pkill -f 'app.server'\"\n }\n }\n]\n```\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ffe25deffeeibuEIqLo9IImp","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Hunt for vulnerabilities in notes service","time":{"start":1793148967479,"end":1793149058622}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Let me try with the correct agent type. 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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149067600,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-00e76256-ffbd-4e88-ab73-a19b257b57bb","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json\nfile\n\n1: {\n2: \"run_id\": \"run-1\",\n3: \"profile\": \"quick\",\n4: \"units\": [\n5: {\n6: \"unit_id\": \"profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems\",\n7: \"description\": \"All in-scope subsystems for quick profile: HTTP handlers, SQL queries, file reads, authentication\",\n8: \"surfaces\": [\n9: \"GET /search\",\n10: \"GET /note\",\n11: \"GET /attachment\",\n12: \"GET /avatar\",\n13: \"POST /delete\"\n14: ],\n15: \"boundaries\": [\n16: \"unauthenticated -> authenticated\",\n17: \"user A -> user B data\",\n18: \"user -> filesystem\",\n19: \"user -> database\"\n20: ],\n21: \"attack_classes\": [\n22: \"injection-sql\",\n23: \"path-traversal\",\n24: \"idor\",\n25: \"auth-bypass\",\n26: \"info-disclosure\"\n27: ],\n28: \"status\": \"planned\",\n29: \"assigned_to\": null,\n30: \"fingerprint\": null,\n31: \"evidence_refs\": [],\n32: \"prior_state\": null,\n33: \"notes\": \"\"\n34: }\n35: ],\n36: \"prior_run_refs\": [],\n37: \"coverage_statement\": \"Quick profile: single coarse unit covering all 5 HTTP endpoints across SQL injection, path traversal, IDOR, auth bypass, and info disclosure attack classes.\"\n38: }\n\n(End of file - total 38 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"{\n \"run_id\": \"run-1\",\n \"profile\": \"quick\",\n \"units\": [\n {\n \"unit_id\": \"profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems\",\n \"description\": \"All in-scope subsystems for quick profile: HTTP handlers, SQL queries, file reads, authentication\",\n \"surfaces\": [\n \"GET /search\",\n \"GET /note\",\n \"GET /attachment\",\n \"GET /avatar\",\n \"POST /delete\"\n ],\n \"boundaries\": [\n \"unauthenticated -> authenticated\",\n \"user A -> user B data\",\n \"user -> filesystem\",\n \"user -> database\"\n ],","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","time":{"start":1793149067586,"end":1793149067598}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The hunter found 4 candidates. Let me analyze them:\n\n1. SQL Injection in /search endpoint - fingerprint: sql-injection-search-endpoint\n2. Path Traversal in /attachment endpoint - fingerprint: path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\n3. IDOR in /delete endpoint - fingerprint: idor-delete-endpoint\n4. Info Disclosure via Path Traversal in /attachment endpoint - fingerprint: info-disclosure-attachment-path-traversal\n\nWait, candidates 2 and 4 are essentially the same vulnerability (path traversal in /attachment leading to info disclosure). They should be consolidated. Let me also check if the avatar endpoint has a path traversal issue - the code has a check but it might be bypassable.\n\nLet me update the coverage ledger with these findings and then run the coverage critic to validate them. But first, I need to consolidate the duplicate finding.\n\nAlso, I notice the hunter didn't find a potential path traversal in the avatar endpoint. Let me check that - the code does:\n```python\npath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, \"avatars\", name))\nif not path.startswith(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, \"avatars\") + os.sep):\n raise PermissionError(\"bad path\")\n```\n\nThis looks like it might be bypassable with certain path tricks (e.g., symlinks, or if FILES_DIR ends with a slash). But for now, let me focus on the found candidates.\n\nLet me update the coverage ledger and then run a critic agent.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18003613d001HPFJ29x2wtdGZO","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180033e5e001Ba5oA7ydqKj7jG"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149069987,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180036a9f001M5EKgAwksAy0n0","messageID":"msg_180036169001Xcg1Ia2Mcto8j5","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149078359,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-68916caf-b581-4d85-9b35-a97e850d7c58","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"content":"{\n \"run_id\": \"run-1\",\n \"profile\": \"quick\",\n \"units\": [\n {\n \"unit_id\": \"profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems\",\n \"description\": \"All in-scope subsystems for quick profile: HTTP handlers, SQL queries, file reads, authentication\",\n \"surfaces\": [\n \"GET /search\",\n \"GET /note\",\n \"GET /attachment\",\n \"GET /avatar\",\n \"POST /delete\"\n ],\n \"boundaries\": [\n \"unauthenticated -> authenticated\",\n \"user A -> user B data\",\n \"user -> filesystem\",\n \"user -> database\"\n ],\n \"attack_classes\": [\n \"injection-sql\",\n \"path-traversal\",\n \"idor\",\n \"auth-bypass\",\n \"info-disclosure\"\n ],\n \"status\": \"hunted\",\n \"assigned_to\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint,path-traversal-attachment-endpoint,idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"evidence_refs\": [\n \"hunter-1/sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"hunter-1/path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n \"hunter-1/idor-delete-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"prior_state\": null,\n \"notes\": \"Hunter wave 1 complete. Found 3 unique candidates (path-traversal and info-disclosure in attachment are same root cause). Avatar endpoint path validation appears sound but needs verification.\"\n }\n ],\n \"prior_run_refs\": [],\n \"coverage_statement\": \"Quick profile: single coarse unit covering all 5 HTTP endpoints across SQL injection, path traversal, IDOR, auth bypass, and info disclosure attack classes. Hunter wave 1 complete with 3 candidates.\"\n}","filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","exists":true,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","time":{"start":1793149078343,"end":1793149078356}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to update the coverage ledger with the hunter findings. The hunter found 4 candidates, but two are duplicates (path traversal and info disclosure in attachment endpoint are the same root cause). Let me update the ledger with the unique fingerprints.\n\nThe unique fingerprints are:\n1. sql-injection-search-endpoint\n2. path-traversal-attachment-endpoint (covers both path traversal and info disclosure)\n3. idor-delete-endpoint\n\nLet me update the ledger.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180038b3f001km193gKGPGAsW5","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180036169001Xcg1Ia2Mcto8j5"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149157966,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-21efa53d-ec29-4d40-8646-3f02a8056bc3","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Coverage critic review of hunter findings","prompt":"You are a coverage critic reviewing the hunter's findings for the notes service audit.\n\nHunter found 3 candidates:\n1. sql-injection-search-endpoint - SQL injection in /search via string interpolation\n2. path-traversal-attachment-endpoint - Path traversal in /attachment via unsanitized filename\n3. idor-delete-endpoint - IDOR in /delete missing ownership check\n\nReview each candidate against the evidence bar:\n- Must name lower-trust principal, accepted input, intended control, crossed boundary, affected resource, concrete result\n- Must have source evidence (file, lines, snippet)\n- Must be a real trust boundary violation, not missing best practice or self-impact\n\nAlso check for gaps: Did the hunter miss anything in the codebase?\n- /note endpoint - uses parameterized query (line 27-29), appears safe\n- /avatar endpoint - has path validation (lines 44-49), check if bypassable\n- Session handling - in-memory, no login endpoint visible, but not a boundary violation per se\n- Auth bypass - no unauthenticated access to endpoints (all check current_user)\n\nFor each candidate, output: ACCEPT, REJECT, or REASSIGN with reason.\nAlso identify any missed vulnerabilities.\n\nReturn JSON:\n{\n \"decisions\": [\n {\"fingerprint\": \"...\", \"decision\": \"ACCEPT|REJECT|REASSIGN\", \"reason\": \"...\"}\n ],\n \"missed\": [\n {\"title\": \"...\", \"attack_class\": \"...\", \"evidence\": {...}, \"reason\": \"why hunter missed it\"}\n ],\n \"coverage_gaps\": [\"...\"]\n}","subagent_type":"explore"},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ffc4dc9ffeA5NKELkfBR6A8V (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\n{\n \"decisions\": [\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"decision\": \"ACCEPT\",\n \"reason\": \"Real trust boundary violation: authenticated user input (term) directly interpolated into SQL query at server.py:22, crossing from HTTP parameter into SQL execution context. Allows data exfiltration/modification of all users' notes. Evidence: line 22 uses string formatting '%%%s%%' % term instead of parameterized query.\"\n },\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n \"decision\": \"ACCEPT\",\n \"reason\": \"Real trust boundary violation: authenticated user input (name) passed directly to os.path.join without validation at server.py:38-41, crossing from HTTP parameter into filesystem access. Allows arbitrary file read (e.g., ../../etc/passwd). Evidence: read_attachment() lacks any path traversal protection unlike read_avatar(); endpoint at line 70 passes raw qs.get('name', '').\"\n },\n {\n \"fingerprint\": \"idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"decision\": \"ACCEPT\",\n \"reason\": \"Real trust boundary violation: authenticated user can delete any note by ID without ownership check at server.py:32-35,81-83. The delete_note() function omits the owner verification present in get_note() (lines 27-29). Endpoint at line 82 calls delete_note(int(qs.get('id', '0'))) without passing user context. Allows horizontal privilege escalation - deleting other users' notes.\"\n }\n ],\n \"missed\": [],\n \"coverage_gaps\": [\n \"/avatar endpoint path validation is correctly implemented (os.path.abspath + startswith directory check) - not bypassable\",\n \"No /login endpoint exists (SESSIONS dict never populated) - functionality gap, not a trust boundary violation\",\n \"All endpoints enforce authentication via X-Session header - no auth bypass\",\n \"/note endpoint uses parameterized query - safe\"\n ]\n}\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ffc4dc9ffeA5NKELkfBR6A8V","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Coverage critic review of hunter findings","time":{"start":1793149088326,"end":1793149157964}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to run the coverage critic (required for quick profile). This is the post-wave critic that will review the hunter findings and accept/reject/reassign them.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18003b2310012Gw0Re5X5UHHhK","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180038b7f0017hbRmdHupv7cHL"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149164080,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-7f79c63a-455a-44cc-89cc-f5df2bc2dc8b","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","content":"{\n \"run_id\": \"run-1\",\n \"profile\": \"quick\",\n \"units\": [\n {\n \"unit_id\": \"profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems\",\n \"description\": \"All in-scope subsystems for quick profile: HTTP handlers, SQL queries, file reads, authentication\",\n \"surfaces\": [\n \"GET /search\",\n \"GET /note\",\n \"GET /attachment\",\n \"GET /avatar\",\n \"POST /delete\"\n ],\n \"boundaries\": [\n \"unauthenticated -> authenticated\",\n \"user A -> user B data\",\n \"user -> filesystem\",\n \"user -> database\"\n ],\n \"attack_classes\": [\n \"injection-sql\",\n \"path-traversal\",\n \"idor\",\n \"auth-bypass\",\n \"info-disclosure\"\n ],\n \"status\": \"critiqued\",\n \"assigned_to\": \"critic-1\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint,path-traversal-attachment-endpoint,idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"evidence_refs\": [\n \"hunter-1/sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"hunter-1/path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n \"hunter-1/idor-delete-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"prior_state\": null,\n \"notes\": \"Critic accepted all 3 candidates. No missed vulnerabilities. Avatar endpoint validation confirmed sound. Auth enforced on all endpoints. /note uses parameterized queries. /login not implemented is a functionality gap not a security boundary violation.\"\n }\n ],\n \"prior_run_refs\": [],\n \"coverage_statement\": \"Quick profile: single coarse unit covering all 5 HTTP endpoints. Critic wave 1 complete - 3 confirmed candidates, 0 missed, 0 coverage gaps with security impact.\"\n}"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","exists":true,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","time":{"start":1793149164064,"end":1793149164078}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The critic accepted all 3 candidates and found no missed vulnerabilities. The coverage gaps noted are not actual vulnerabilities but rather confirmed safe areas or functionality gaps.\n\nNow I need to proceed to candidate validation. Since this is a quick profile, I should use one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification. Let me create verifier agents for each candidate.\n\nBut first, let me update the coverage ledger with the critic's decisions.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18004da1a001G96CIhCmM0EzM2","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18004c26b001b1BzFKg901OK8C"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149183852,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-dfa49fa7-2a7f-40b0-ac91-eb423b34f09c","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"prompt":"You are an independent verifier validating the SQL injection candidate for the notes service.\n\nCandidate: sql-injection-search-endpoint\nEvidence: app/server.py lines 20-23\n- search_notes() uses string interpolation: `q = \"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\" % (user_id, term)`\n- term comes from `qs.get(\"q\", \"\")` in GET /search handler\n- No parameterization, direct string formatting into query\n\nYour task: Verify this is a real, exploitable SQL injection with concrete boundary violation.\n\nCheck:\n1. Can an authenticated user control the 'term' parameter? Yes - via query string 'q'\n2. Does the string interpolation allow SQL syntax injection? Yes - term goes inside LIKE '%%%s%%' with no escaping\n3. What's the concrete impact? Attacker can inject SQL to: read other users' notes via UNION, extract schema, modify data, etc.\n4. Is there any mitigating control? No - no WAF, no input validation, no parameterization\n5. Does the boundary violation cross a trust boundary? Yes - authenticated user (lower trust for data they don't own) reaches database with elevated SQL execution\n\nConfirm the vulnerability is real and exploitable. Provide:\n- Verified: true/false\n- Severity: critical/high/medium/low/informational (with justification)\n- Fix: smallest effective source change (parameterized query)\n- Any issues with hunter's evidence or reproduction","subagent_type":"explore","description":"Validate SQL injection candidate"},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ffb0467ffeVJdigl1punkuJE (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\n**Verified: true**\n\n**Severity: Critical**\n\n**Justification:**\n- The `search_notes()` function at line 22 uses direct string interpolation (`%s`) to inject user-controlled `term` into the SQL query\n- The `term` comes directly from the query string `q` parameter at line 66 with zero validation or escaping\n- An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL via the `q` parameter (e.g., `' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes--`) to bypass the `owner = %d` filter and read all users' notes\n- The codebase itself demonstrates the correct pattern elsewhere: `get_note()` at line 28 uses parameterized queries (`?` placeholders)\n- No mitigating controls exist (no WAF, no input validation, no ORM)\n\n**Concrete Exploit:**\n```\nGET /search?q=' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes--\n```\nThis returns all notes from all users, violating the authorization boundary.\n\n**Smallest Effective Fix** (change line 22):\n```python\n# Before (vulnerable):\nq = \"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\" % (user_id, term)\n\n# After (parameterized):\nq = \"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = ? AND title LIKE ?\"\nreturn db().execute(q, (user_id, f\"%{term}%\")).fetchall()\n```\n\n**Hunter's Evidence Assessment:** Accurate and complete. Lines 20-23 and the `/search` handler at line 66 correctly identify the vulnerability. The reproduction path is valid — any authenticated user can exploit this via the query string.\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ffb0467ffeVJdigl1punkuJE","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Validate SQL injection candidate","time":{"start":1793149172644,"end":1793149183850}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to run candidate validation. For quick profile, I need one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification. Let me launch 3 verifier agents, one for each candidate.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18004fb95001D56vbl6F0w2RZH","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18004da48001yLIV23VGYHmc6I"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149222755,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-41af24ba-86c6-4afa-bbb0-49e029fc3a2e","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"subagent_type":"explore","description":"Validate path traversal candidate","prompt":"You are an independent verifier validating the path traversal candidate for the notes service.\n\nCandidate: path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\nEvidence: app/server.py lines 38-41, 69-70\n- read_attachment(name): `path = os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name)` then `open(path, \"rb\")`\n- Called from GET /attachment handler at line 70 with raw `qs.get(\"name\", \"\")`\n- No path validation, unlike read_avatar() which has `startswith` check\n\nYour task: Verify this is a real, exploitable path traversal with concrete boundary violation.\n\nCheck:\n1. Can an authenticated user control the 'name' parameter? Yes - via query string 'name'\n2. Does os.path.join allow directory traversal? Yes - `os.path.join(\"/base\", \"../../etc/passwd\")` returns `/base/../../etc/passwd` which resolves to `/etc/passwd`\n3. What's the concrete impact? Attacker reads arbitrary files readable by server process\n4. Is there any mitigating control? No - no path validation in read_attachment (unlike read_avatar)\n5. Does the boundary violation cross a trust boundary? Yes - authenticated user reaches server filesystem outside FILES_DIR\n\nConfirm the vulnerability is real and exploitable. Provide:\n- Verified: true/false\n- Severity: critical/high/medium/low/informational (with justification)\n- Fix: smallest effective source change (path containment check)\n- Any issues with hunter's evidence or reproduction"},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ffab20dffeYfw7eV0xOf7Txc (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\n**Verification Complete**\n\n## Verified: true\n\nThe path traversal vulnerability in `read_attachment` is **real and exploitable**.\n\n---\n\n## Evidence Analysis\n\n| Check | Result |\n|-------|--------|\n| 1. User controls `name` parameter? | **Yes** - Line 70: `qs.get(\"name\", \"\")` passed directly from query string |\n| 2. `os.path.join` allows traversal? | **Yes** - `os.path.join(\"/base\", \"../../etc/passwd\")` → `/base/../../etc/passwd` → resolves to `/etc/passwd` |\n| 3. Concrete impact? | **Arbitrary file read** - Any file readable by the server process (config, secrets, source code, `/etc/passwd`, etc.) |\n| 4. Mitigating controls? | **None** - `read_attachment` has **zero validation** (unlike `read_avatar` at lines 44-49) |\n| 5. Crosses trust boundary? | **Yes** - Authenticated user reaches server filesystem outside `FILES_DIR` |\n\n---\n\n## Severity: **High**\n\n**Justification:**\n- Requires authentication (session token via `X-Session` header) — limits exposure to logged-in users\n- Allows **full arbitrary file read** on server filesystem\n- Could expose: database credentials, API keys, source code, system files, other users' data\n- No rate limiting or audit logging visible\n- Contrast with `read_avatar` which **does** implement proper containment (lines 45-47)\n\n---\n\n## Fix: Smallest Effective Change\n\nAdd path containment validation to `read_attachment` (mirroring `read_avatar`):\n\n```python\ndef read_attachment(name):\n path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name))\n if not path.startswith(FILES_DIR + os.sep):\n raise PermissionError(\"bad path\")\n with open(path, \"rb\") as f:\n return f.read()\n```\n\n**Changes:**\n1. `os.path.abspath()` to resolve `..` before the check\n2. `startswith(FILES_DIR + os.sep)` ensures path stays within `FILES_DIR`\n3. Raises `PermissionError` (consistent with `read_avatar`)\n\n---\n\n## Issues with Hunter's Evidence/Reproduction\n\n| Aspect | Status |\n|--------|--------|\n| Lines cited (38-41, 69-70) | **Accurate** — matches current code |\n| `read_avatar` comparison | **Valid** — demonstrates the missing control exists in the same file |\n| Authentication requirement | **Noted** — hunter correctly identifies authenticated user can exploit |\n| Reproduction steps | **Sufficient** — `GET /attachment?name=../../etc/passwd` with valid `X-Session` header |\n\n**No material issues found.** The evidence is complete and the vulnerability is confirmed exploitable.\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ffab20dffeYfw7eV0xOf7Txc","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Validate path traversal candidate","time":{"start":1793149193723,"end":1793149222753}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The SQL injection candidate is verified as critical. Now let me verify the path traversal candidate.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180054def0015pZU9qJ579oVxd","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180052785001PHKJGGvmzS0UmD"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149224769,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18005c73d001X7OMWbPBVNBu7k","messageID":"msg_18005bf7f001nj1duUxvzwwR54","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149251401,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-6e2c6d82-dc02-48cb-9422-90d7fba8d118","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"subagent_type":"explore","prompt":"You are an independent verifier validating the IDOR candidate for the notes service.\n\nCandidate: idor-delete-endpoint\nEvidence: app/server.py lines 32-35, 81-83\n- delete_note(note_id): `con.execute(\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ?\", (note_id,))` - NO owner check\n- Called from POST /delete handler at line 82 with `int(qs.get(\"id\", \"0\"))`\n- No user context passed to delete_note()\n- Compare to get_note() at lines 27-29 which DOES check owner\n\nYour task: Verify this is a real, exploitable IDOR with concrete boundary violation.\n\nCheck:\n1. Can an authenticated user control the 'id' parameter? Yes - via query string 'id'\n2. Does delete_note lack ownership verification? Yes - only filters by id, not owner\n3. What's the concrete impact? Attacker deletes any note by ID regardless of ownership\n4. Is there any mitigating control? No - no ownership check, no user context passed\n5. Does the boundary violation cross a trust boundary? Yes - user A deletes user B's note (horizontal privilege escalation)\n\nConfirm the vulnerability is real and exploitable. Provide:\n- Verified: true/false\n- Severity: critical/high/medium/low/informational (with justification)\n- Fix: smallest effective source change (add owner parameter and check)\n- Any issues with hunter's evidence or reproduction","description":"Validate IDOR candidate"},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ffa1fefffeh1ze0PqEadEOZ4 (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\n**Verified: true**\n\n**Severity: high** — Authenticated users can delete any note by ID across all users (horizontal privilege escalation). Requires valid session but bypasses authorization entirely. Data integrity impact; no RCE or data exfiltration.\n\n**Evidence confirmed:**\n- Line 32-35: `delete_note(note_id)` executes `DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ?` — **no owner check**\n- Line 81-83: POST `/delete` calls `delete_note(int(qs.get(\"id\", \"0\")))` — user controls `id` via query string\n- Line 78: `user = current_user(self)` — authenticated user available but **not passed** to `delete_note()`\n- Line 26-29: `get_note(user_id, note_id)` correctly uses `WHERE id = ? AND owner = ?` — proves the pattern exists and is intentionally omitted in delete\n\n**Fix (smallest effective change):**\n```python\n# Line 32-35: add user_id parameter and owner check\ndef delete_note(user_id, note_id):\n con = db()\n con.execute(\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ? AND owner = ?\", (note_id, user_id))\n con.commit()\n\n# Line 82: pass user context\ndelete_note(user, int(qs.get(\"id\", \"0\")))\n```\n\n**No issues with hunter's evidence** — reproduction is accurate and complete. The boundary violation is confirmed: trust boundary crossed between authenticated user context and data access layer.\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ffa1fefffeh1ze0PqEadEOZ4","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Validate IDOR candidate","time":{"start":1793149231131,"end":1793149251399}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The path traversal candidate is verified as high severity. Now let me verify the IDOR candidate.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18005e00b001767qoPVKUr85iV","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18005bf7f001nj1duUxvzwwR54"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149254285,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-5fdcf81d-78c2-49b8-87ef-b9e9fa04f634","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/report-schema.json"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/report-schema.json\nfile\n\n1: {\n2: \"$comment\": \"Top-level contract for findings.json. validate-findings.cjs interprets and checks this schema directly.\",\n3: \"type\": \"array\",\n4: \"items\": {\n5: \"oneOf\": [\n6: {\n7: \"type\": \"object\",\n8: \"description\": \"A source-grounded vulnerability that was independently demonstrated.\",\n9: \"properties\": {\n10: \"verdict\": {\n11: \"type\": \"string\",\n12: \"const\": \"confirmed\"\n13: },\n14: \"fingerprint\": {\n15: \"type\": \"string\",\n16: \"minLength\": 1,\n17: \"pattern\": \"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$\",\n18: \"description\": \"A stable source-derived identifier that does not change between validation states.\"\n19: },\n20: \"title\": {\n21: \"type\": \"string\",\n22: \"minLength\": 1,\n23: \"visibleContent\": true\n24: },\n25: \"description\": {\n26: \"type\": \"string\",\n27: \"minLength\": 1,\n28: \"visibleContent\": true\n29: },\n30: \"root_cause\": {\n31: \"type\": \"string\",\n32: \"minLength\": 1,\n33: \"visibleContent\": true\n34: },\n35: \"intended_behavior\": {\n36: \"type\": \"string\",\n37: \"minLength\": 1,\n38: \"visibleContent\": true\n39: },\n40: \"trace\": {\n41: \"type\": \"array\",\n42: \"minItems\": 1,\n43: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n44: \"items\": {\n45: \"type\": \"object\",\n46: \"properties\": {\n47: \"kind\": {\n48: \"type\": \"string\",\n49: \"enum\": [\"entrypoint\", \"propagation\", \"sink\"]\n50: },\n51: \"file\": {\n52: \"type\": \"string\",\n53: \"minLength\": 1\n54: },\n55: \"line\": {\n56: \"type\": \"integer\",\n57: \"minimum\": 1\n58: },\n59: \"scope\": {\n60: \"type\": \"string\",\n61: \"minLength\": 1,\n62: \"visibleContent\": true\n63: },\n64: \"description\": {\n65: \"type\": \"string\",\n66: \"minLength\": 1,\n67: \"visibleContent\": true\n68: }\n69: },\n70: \"required\": [\"kind\", \"file\", \"line\", \"scope\", \"description\"],\n71: \"additionalProperties\": false\n72: }\n73: },\n74: \"evidence\": {\n75: \"type\": \"array\",\n76: \"minItems\": 1,\n77: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n78: \"items\": {\n79: \"type\": \"object\",\n80: \"properties\": {\n81: \"file\": {\n82: \"type\": \"string\",\n83: \"minLength\": 1\n84: },\n85: \"line\": {\n86: \"type\": \"integer\",\n87: \"minimum\": 1\n88: },\n89: \"description\": {\n90: \"type\": \"string\",\n91: \"minLength\": 1,\n92: \"visibleContent\": true\n93: }\n94: },\n95: \"required\": [\"file\", \"line\", \"description\"],\n96: \"additionalProperties\": false\n97: }\n98: },\n99: \"conditions\": {\n100: \"type\": \"array\",\n101: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n102: \"items\": {\n103: \"type\": \"object\",\n104: \"properties\": {\n105: \"kind\": {\n106: \"type\": \"string\",\n107: \"enum\": [\"authentication_level\", \"authorization_role\", \"user_interaction\", \"system_configuration\", \"network_routing\", \"environmental_dependency\", \"data_state\", \"timing_dependency\", \"third_party_dependency\"]\n108: },\n109: \"description\": {\n110: \"type\": \"string\",\n111: \"minLength\": 1,\n112: \"visibleContent\": true\n113: }\n114: },\n115: \"required\": [\"kind\", \"description\"],\n116: \"additionalProperties\": false\n117: }\n118: },\n119: \"execution\": {\n120: \"type\": \"object\",\n121: \"description\": \"Target-neutral reproduction in the target's native interface.\",\n122: \"properties\": {\n123: \"attacker_perspective\": {\n124: \"type\": \"string\",\n125: \"minLength\": 1,\n126: \"visibleContent\": true\n127: },\n128: \"payloads\": {\n129: \"type\": \"array\",\n130: \"minItems\": 1,\n131: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n132: \"items\": {\n133: \"type\": \"string\"\n134: }\n135: },\n136: \"instructions\": {\n137: \"type\": \"array\",\n138: \"minItems\": 1,\n139: \"items\": {\n140: \"type\": \"string\",\n141: \"minLength\": 1,\n142: \"visibleContent\": true\n143: }\n144: },\n145: \"observed_result\": {\n146: \"type\": \"string\",\n147: \"minLength\": 1,\n148: \"visibleContent\": true\n149: }\n150: },\n151: \"required\": [\"attacker_perspective\", \"payloads\", \"instructions\", \"observed_result\"],\n152: \"additionalProperties\": false\n153: },\n154: \"remediation\": {\n155: \"type\": \"object\",\n156: \"properties\": {\n157: \"strategy\": {\n158: \"type\": \"string\",\n159: \"minLength\": 1,\n160: \"visibleContent\": true\n161: },\n162: \"code_changes\": {\n163: \"type\": \"array\",\n164: \"items\": {\n165: \"type\": \"object\",\n166: \"properties\": {\n167: \"file_name\": {\n168: \"type\": \"string\",\n169: \"minLength\": 1\n170: },\n171: \"fixed_code\": {\n172: \"type\": \"string\"\n173: }\n174: },\n175: \"required\": [\"file_name\", \"fixed_code\"],\n176: \"additionalProperties\": false\n177: }\n178: }\n179: },\n180: \"required\": [\"strategy\"],\n181: \"additionalProperties\": false\n182: },\n183: \"severity\": {\n184: \"type\": \"object\",\n185: \"properties\": {\n186: \"likelihood\": {\n187: \"type\": \"object\",\n188: \"properties\": {\n189: \"score\": {\n190: \"type\": \"string\",\n191: \"enum\": [\"informational\", \"low\", \"medium\", \"high\", \"critical\"]\n192: },\n193: \"reason\": {\n194: \"type\": \"string\",\n195: \"minLength\": 1,\n196: \"visibleContent\": true\n197: }\n198: },\n199: \"required\": [\"score\", \"reason\"],\n200: \"additionalProperties\": false\n201: },\n202: \"impact\": {\n203: \"type\": \"object\",\n204: \"properties\": {\n205: \"score\": {\n206: \"type\": \"string\",\n207: \"enum\": [\"informational\", \"low\", \"medium\", \"high\", \"critical\"]\n208: },\n209: \"reason\": {\n210: \"type\": \"string\",\n211: \"minLength\": 1,\n212: \"visibleContent\": true\n213: }\n214: },\n215: \"required\": [\"score\", \"reason\"],\n216: \"additionalProperties\": false\n217: },\n218: \"overall_severity\": {\n219: \"type\": \"string\",\n220: \"enum\": [\"informational\", \"low\", \"medium\", \"high\", \"critical\"]\n221: }\n222: },\n223: \"required\": [\"likelihood\", \"impact\", \"overall_severity\"],\n224: \"additionalProperties\": false\n225: },\n226: \"confidence\": {\n227: \"type\": \"object\",\n228: \"properties\": {\n229: \"score\": {\n230: \"type\": \"string\",\n231: \"enum\": [\"low\", \"medium\", \"high\"]\n232: },\n233: \"reason\": {\n234: \"type\": \"string\",\n235: \"minLength\": 1,\n236: \"visibleContent\": true\n237: }\n238: },\n239: \"required\": [\"score\", \"reason\"],\n240: \"additionalProperties\": false\n241: }\n242: },\n243: \"required\": [\"verdict\", \"fingerprint\", \"title\", \"description\", \"root_cause\", \"intended_behavior\", \"trace\", \"evidence\", \"conditions\", \"execution\", \"remediation\", \"severity\", \"confidence\"],\n244: \"additionalProperties\": false\n245: },\n246: {\n247: \"type\": \"object\",\n248: \"description\": \"A source-grounded candidate whose decisive validation is blocked.\",\n249: \"properties\": {\n250: \"verdict\": {\n251: \"type\": \"string\",\n252: \"const\": \"needs_validation\"\n253: },\n254: \"fingerprint\": {\n255: \"type\": \"string\",\n256: \"minLength\": 1,\n257: \"pattern\": \"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$\"\n258: },\n259: \"title\": {\n260: \"type\": \"string\",\n261: \"minLength\": 1,\n262: \"visibleContent\": true\n263: },\n264: \"description\": {\n265: \"type\": \"string\",\n266: \"minLength\": 1,\n267: \"visibleContent\": true\n268: },\n269: \"claimed_root_cause\": {\n270: \"type\": \"string\",\n271: \"minLength\": 1,\n272: \"visibleContent\": true\n273: },\n274: \"trace\": {\n275: \"type\": \"array\",\n276: \"minItems\": 1,\n277: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n278: \"items\": {\n279: \"type\": \"object\",\n280: \"properties\": {\n281: \"kind\": {\n282: \"type\": \"string\",\n283: \"enum\": [\"entrypoint\", \"propagation\", \"sink\"]\n284: },\n285: \"file\": {\n286: \"type\": \"string\",\n287: \"minLength\": 1\n288: },\n289: \"line\": {\n290: \"type\": \"integer\",\n291: \"minimum\": 1\n292: },\n293: \"scope\": {\n294: \"type\": \"string\",\n295: \"minLength\": 1,\n296: \"visibleContent\": true\n297: },\n298: \"description\": {\n299: \"type\": \"string\",\n300: \"minLength\": 1,\n301: \"visibleContent\": true\n302: }\n303: },\n304: \"required\": [\"kind\", \"file\", \"line\", \"scope\", \"description\"],\n305: \"additionalProperties\": false\n306: }\n307: },\n308: \"evidence\": {\n309: \"type\": \"array\",\n310: \"minItems\": 1,\n311: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n312: \"items\": {\n313: \"type\": \"object\",\n314: \"properties\": {\n315: \"file\": {\n316: \"type\": \"string\",\n317: \"minLength\": 1\n318: },\n319: \"line\": {\n320: \"type\": \"integer\",\n321: \"minimum\": 1\n322: },\n323: \"description\": {\n324: \"type\": \"string\",\n325: \"minLength\": 1,\n326: \"visibleContent\": true\n327: }\n328: },\n329: \"required\": [\"file\", \"line\", \"description\"],\n330: \"additionalProperties\": false\n331: }\n332: },\n333: \"blockers\": {\n334: \"type\": \"array\",\n335: \"minItems\": 1,\n336: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n337: \"items\": {\n338: \"type\": \"string\",\n339: \"minLength\": 1,\n340: \"visibleContent\": true\n341: }\n342: },\n343: \"validation_plan\": {\n344: \"type\": \"object\",\n345: \"properties\": {\n346: \"local\": {\n347: \"type\": \"string\",\n348: \"minLength\": 1,\n349: \"visibleContent\": true\n350: },\n351: \"deployment\": {\n352: \"type\": \"string\",\n353: \"minLength\": 1,\n354: \"visibleContent\": true\n355: }\n356: },\n357: \"additionalProperties\": false\n358: }\n359: },\n360: \"required\": [\"verdict\", \"fingerprint\", \"title\", \"description\", \"claimed_root_cause\", \"trace\", \"evidence\", \"blockers\", \"validation_plan\"],\n361: \"additionalProperties\": false\n362: },\n363: {\n364: \"type\": \"object\",\n365: \"description\": \"A source-grounded candidate refuted during validation.\",\n366: \"properties\": {\n367: \"verdict\": {\n368: \"type\": \"string\",\n369: \"const\": \"rejected\"\n370: },\n371: \"fingerprint\": {\n372: \"type\": \"string\",\n373: \"minLength\": 1,\n374: \"pattern\": \"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$\"\n375: },\n376: \"title\": {\n377: \"type\": \"string\",\n378: \"minLength\": 1,\n379: \"visibleContent\": true\n380: },\n381: \"description\": {\n382: \"type\": \"string\",\n383: \"minLength\": 1,\n384: \"visibleContent\": true\n385: },\n386: \"claimed_root_cause\": {\n387: \"type\": \"string\",\n388: \"minLength\": 1,\n389: \"visibleContent\": true\n390: },\n391: \"trace\": {\n392: \"type\": \"array\",\n393: \"minItems\": 1,\n394: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n395: \"items\": {\n396: \"type\": \"object\",\n397: \"properties\": {\n398: \"kind\": {\n399: \"type\": \"string\",\n400: \"enum\": [\"entrypoint\", \"propagation\", \"sink\"]\n401: },\n402: \"file\": {\n403: \"type\": \"string\",\n404: \"minLength\": 1\n405: },\n406: \"line\": {\n407: \"type\": \"integer\",\n408: \"minimum\": 1\n409: },\n410: \"scope\": {\n411: \"type\": \"string\",\n412: \"minLength\": 1,\n413: \"visibleContent\": true\n414: },\n415: \"description\": {\n416: \"type\": \"string\",\n417: \"minLength\": 1,\n418: \"visibleContent\": true\n419: }\n420: },\n421: \"required\": [\"kind\", \"file\", \"line\", \"scope\", \"description\"],\n422: \"additionalProperties\": false\n423: }\n424: },\n425: \"evidence\": {\n426: \"type\": \"array\",\n427: \"minItems\": 1,\n428: \"uniqueItems\": true,\n429: \"items\": {\n430: \"type\": \"object\",\n431: \"properties\": {\n432: \"file\": {\n433: \"type\": \"string\",\n434: \"minLength\": 1\n435: },\n436: \"line\": {\n437: \"type\": \"integer\",\n438: \"minimum\": 1\n439: },\n440: \"description\": {\n441: \"type\": \"string\",\n442: \"minLength\": 1,\n443: \"visibleContent\": true\n444: }\n445: },\n446: \"required\": [\"file\", \"line\", \"description\"],\n447: \"additionalProperties\": false\n448: }\n449: },\n450: \"reason\": {\n451: \"type\": \"string\",\n452: \"minLength\": 1,\n453: \"visibleContent\": true\n454: }\n455: },\n456: \"required\": [\"verdict\", \"fingerprint\", \"title\", \"description\", \"claimed_root_cause\", \"trace\", \"evidence\", \"reason\"],\n457: \"additionalProperties\": false\n458: }\n459: ]\n460: }\n461: }\n\n(End of file - total 461 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"{\n \"$comment\": \"Top-level contract for findings.json. validate-findings.cjs interprets and checks this schema directly.\",\n \"type\": \"array\",\n \"items\": {\n \"oneOf\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"object\",\n \"description\": \"A source-grounded vulnerability that was independently demonstrated.\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"verdict\": {\n \"type\": \"string\",\n \"const\": \"confirmed\"\n },\n \"fingerprint\": {\n \"type\": \"string\",\n \"minLength\": 1,\n \"pattern\": \"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$\",\n \"description\": \"A stable source-derived identifier that does not change between validation states.\"\n },\n \"title\": {","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".agents/skills/security-audit/report-schema.json","time":{"start":1793149254276,"end":1793149254283}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"All three candidates are verified. Now I need to create the findings.json file with the confirmed records, then validate it with the schema and the validate-findings.cjs script. Let me also update the coverage ledger to mark these as candidates/confirmed.\n\nLet me first check the report-schema.json and validate-findings.cjs to understand the expected format.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180063a7f001OgG3yj5UjJ8NH8","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180062f62001EkuKP6l76W1duf"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149257086,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18006457b001k1MmzBBvsrzsVy","messageID":"msg_180063ac1001kCTqQBBaNvirhr","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149259291,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-e9aa57ea-7928-4886-ac04-63625cf8a97e","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs\nfile\n\n1: #!/usr/bin/env node\n2: \n3: /**\n4: * Validates findings.json against report-schema.json.\n5: * Usage: node validate-findings.cjs \n6: *\n7: * This is a dependency-free interpreter for the JSON Schema keywords used by\n8: * report-schema.json, plus finding-specific checks that are clearer in code.\n9: */\n10: \n11: const fs = require(\"fs\");\n12: const path = require(\"path\");\n13: const { TextDecoder } = require(\"util\");\n14: \n15: const hasOwn = (value, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key);\n16: const SUPPORTED_TYPES = new Set([\"object\", \"array\", \"string\", \"integer\", \"number\", \"boolean\", \"null\"]);\n17: const SUPPORTED_KEYWORDS = new Set([\n18: \"$comment\",\n19: \"additionalProperties\",\n20: \"const\",\n21: \"description\",\n22: \"enum\",\n23: \"items\",\n24: \"minimum\",\n25: \"minItems\",\n26: \"minLength\",\n27: \"oneOf\",\n28: \"pattern\",\n29: \"properties\",\n30: \"required\",\n31: \"type\",\n32: \"uniqueItems\",\n33: \"visibleContent\",\n34: ]);\n35: const SEVERITY_RANK = new Map([\n36: [\"informational\", 0],\n37: [\"low\", 1],\n38: [\"medium\", 2],\n39: [\"high\", 3],\n40: [\"critical\", 4],\n41: ]);\n42: const LIMITS = Object.freeze({\n43: inputBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,\n44: nestingDepth: 64,\n45: arrayItems: 1000,\n46: canonicalKeyBytes: 1024 * 1024,\n47: uniqueSetBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,\n48: validationErrors: 100,\n49: });\n50: const VISIBLE_CONTENT = /[^\\p{White_Space}\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;\n51: const PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER = /[\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Zl}\\p{Zp}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;\n52: const WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|clock\\$|conin\\$|conout\\$|com[1-9\\u00b9\\u00b2\\u00b3]|lpt[1-9\\u00b9\\u00b2\\u00b3])(?:\\.|$)/iu;\n53: const UTF8_DECODER = new TextDecoder(\"utf-8\", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true });\n54: const UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER = /[\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Cs}\\p{Zl}\\p{Zp}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/gu;\n55: const MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH = 256;\n56: \n57: class JsonStructureError extends Error {}\n58: class SafeInputError extends Error {}\n59: \n60: function escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(value) {\n61: return String(value).replace(UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER, (character) => {\n62: const codePoint = character.codePointAt(0);\n63: return codePoint <= 0xffff\n64: ? `\\\\u${codePoint.toString(16).padStart(4, \"0\")}`\n65: : `\\\\u{${codePoint.toString(16)}}`;\n66: });\n67: }\n68: \n69: function safeQuote(value) {\n70: let serialized;\n71: if (typeof value === \"string\") {\n72: const clipped = value.length > MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH\n73: ? `${value.slice(0, MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH)}...`\n74: : value;\n75: serialized = JSON.stringify(clipped);\n76: } else if (value === null || typeof value === \"boolean\") {\n77: serialized = String(value);\n78: } else if (typeof value === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(value)) {\n79: serialized = String(value);\n80: } else {\n81: serialized = `\"<${Array.isArray(value) ? \"array\" : typeof value}>\"`;\n82: }\n83: return escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(serialized);\n84: }\n85: \n86: function propertyPath(base, key) {\n87: return /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(key)\n88: ? `${base}.${key}`\n89: : `${base}[${safeQuote(key)}]`;\n90: }\n91: \n92: function createErrorList() {\n93: const errors = [];\n94: Object.defineProperty(errors, \"push\", {\n95: value(...messages) {\n96: const remaining = LIMITS.validationErrors - this.length;\n97: if (remaining > 0) {\n98: Array.prototype.push.apply(this, messages.slice(0, remaining).map(escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters));\n99: }\n100: return this.length;\n101: },\n102: });\n103: return errors;\n104: }\n105: \n106: function typeOf(value) {\n107: if (Array.isArray(value)) return \"array\";\n108: if (value === null) return \"null\";\n109: return typeof value;\n110: }\n111: \n112: function deepEqual(left, right) {\n113: if (left === right) return true;\n114: if (typeOf(left) !== typeOf(right)) return false;\n115: if (Array.isArray(left)) {\n116: return left.length === right.length && left.every((value, index) => deepEqual(value, right[index]));\n117: }\n118: if (left !== null && typeof left === \"object\") {\n119: const leftKeys = Object.keys(left);\n120: const rightKeys = Object.keys(right);\n121: return leftKeys.length === rightKeys.length &&\n122: leftKeys.every((key) => hasOwn(right, key) && deepEqual(left[key], right[key]));\n123: }\n124: return false;\n125: }\n126: \n127: function codePointLength(value) {\n128: let length = 0;\n129: let index = 0;\n130: while (index < value.length) {\n131: const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);\n132: if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff && index < value.length) {\n133: const second = value.charCodeAt(index);\n134: if (second >= 0xdc00 && second <= 0xdfff) index++;\n135: }\n136: length++;\n137: }\n138: return length;\n139: }\n140: \n141: function hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) {\n142: let index = 0;\n143: while (index < value.length) {\n144: const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);\n145: if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff) {\n146: if (index >= value.length) return false;\n147: const second = value.charCodeAt(index++);\n148: if (second < 0xdc00 || second > 0xdfff) return false;\n149: } else if (first >= 0xdc00 && first <= 0xdfff) {\n150: return false;\n151: }\n152: }\n153: return true;\n154: }\n155: \n156: function hasVisibleProse(value) {\n157: return hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) && VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value);\n158: }\n159: \n160: function canonicalKey(value) {\n161: const chunks = [];\n162: let bytes = 0;\n163: \n164: function append(chunk) {\n165: bytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk);\n166: if (bytes > LIMITS.canonicalKeyBytes) {\n167: throw new Error(`canonical key exceeds ${LIMITS.canonicalKeyBytes} byte limit`);\n168: }\n169: chunks.push(chunk);\n170: }\n171: \n172: function encode(item) {\n173: const type = typeOf(item);\n174: if (type === \"null\") {\n175: append(\"null\");\n176: } else if (type === \"string\") {\n177: append(`string:${JSON.stringify(item)}`);\n178: } else if (type === \"number\") {\n179: append(`number:${Object.is(item, -0) ? \"0\" : String(item)}`);\n180: } else if (type === \"boolean\") {\n181: append(`boolean:${item ? \"true\" : \"false\"}`);\n182: } else if (type === \"array\") {\n183: append(\"array:[\");\n184: item.forEach((entry, index) => {\n185: if (index > 0) append(\",\");\n186: encode(entry);\n187: });\n188: append(\"]\");\n189: } else if (type === \"object\") {\n190: append(\"object:{\");\n191: Object.keys(item).sort().forEach((key, index) => {\n192: if (index > 0) append(\",\");\n193: append(JSON.stringify(key));\n194: append(\":\");\n195: encode(item[key]);\n196: });\n197: append(\"}\");\n198: } else {\n199: append(`${type}:${String(item)}`);\n200: }\n201: }\n202: \n203: encode(value);\n204: return { key: chunks.join(\"\"), bytes };\n205: }\n206: \n207: function collectDataLimitErrors(value, location = \"$data\") {\n208: const stack = [{ value, location, depth: value !== null && typeof value === \"object\" ? 1 : 0 }];\n209: const seen = new WeakSet();\n210: \n211: while (stack.length > 0) {\n212: const current = stack.pop();\n213: if (current.value === null || typeof current.value !== \"object\") continue;\n214: if (current.depth > LIMITS.nestingDepth) {\n215: return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.nestingDepth} level nesting depth limit`)];\n216: }\n217: if (seen.has(current.value)) {\n218: return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: input must not contain repeated or cyclic object references`)];\n219: }\n220: seen.add(current.value);\n221: \n222: if (Array.isArray(current.value)) {\n223: if (current.value.length > LIMITS.arrayItems) {\n224: return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.arrayItems} item array limit`)];\n225: }\n226: for (let index = current.value.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {\n227: const child = current.value[index];\n228: if (child !== null && typeof child === \"object\") {\n229: stack.push({ value: child, location: `${current.location}[${index}]`, depth: current.depth + 1 });\n230: }\n231: }\n232: } else {\n233: const keys = Object.keys(current.value);\n234: for (let index = keys.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {\n235: const key = keys[index];\n236: const child = current.value[key];\n237: if (child !== null && typeof child === \"object\") {\n238: stack.push({ value: child, location: propertyPath(current.location, key), depth: current.depth + 1 });\n239: }\n240: }\n241: }\n242: }\n243: \n244: return [];\n245: }\n246: \n247: function collectSchemaErrors(schema, location = \"schema\") {\n248: const errors = createErrorList();\n249: \n250: function check(node, p) {\n251: if (node === null || typeof node !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(node)) {\n252: errors.push(`${p}: schema must be an object`);\n253: return;\n254: }\n255: \n256: for (const key of Object.keys(node)) {\n257: if (!SUPPORTED_KEYWORDS.has(key)) errors.push(`${p}: unsupported schema keyword ${safeQuote(key)}`);\n258: }\n259: \n260: if (hasOwn(node, \"$comment\") && typeof node.$comment !== \"string\") {\n261: errors.push(`${p}.$comment: expected string`);\n262: }\n263: if (hasOwn(node, \"description\") && typeof node.description !== \"string\") {\n264: errors.push(`${p}.description: expected string`);\n265: }\n266: if (hasOwn(node, \"type\") && (!SUPPORTED_TYPES.has(node.type))) {\n267: errors.push(`${p}.type: unsupported type ${safeQuote(node.type)}`);\n268: }\n269: if (hasOwn(node, \"properties\")) {\n270: if (node.properties === null || typeof node.properties !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(node.properties)) {\n271: errors.push(`${p}.properties: expected object`);\n272: } else {\n273: for (const key of Object.keys(node.properties)) check(node.properties[key], propertyPath(`${p}.properties`, key));\n274: }\n275: }\n276: if (hasOwn(node, \"required\")) {\n277: if (!Array.isArray(node.required) || node.required.some((key) => typeof key !== \"string\")) {\n278: errors.push(`${p}.required: expected an array of strings`);\n279: } else if (new Set(node.required).size !== node.required.length) {\n280: errors.push(`${p}.required: entries must be unique`);\n281: }\n282: }\n283: if (hasOwn(node, \"additionalProperties\") && typeof node.additionalProperties !== \"boolean\") {\n284: errors.push(`${p}.additionalProperties: only boolean values are supported`);\n285: }\n286: if (hasOwn(node, \"enum\")) {\n287: if (!Array.isArray(node.enum) || node.enum.length === 0) {\n288: errors.push(`${p}.enum: expected a non-empty array`);\n289: } else {\n290: const seen = new Set();\n291: for (const value of node.enum) {\n292: let key;\n293: try {\n294: key = canonicalKey(value).key;\n295: } catch (error) {\n296: errors.push(`${p}.enum: ${error.message}`);\n297: break;\n298: }\n299: if (seen.has(key)) {\n300: errors.push(`${p}.enum: entries must be unique`);\n301: break;\n302: }\n303: seen.add(key);\n304: }\n305: }\n306: }\n307: if (hasOwn(node, \"items\")) check(node.items, `${p}.items`);\n308: for (const keyword of [\"minItems\", \"minLength\"]) {\n309: if (hasOwn(node, keyword) && (!Number.isInteger(node[keyword]) || node[keyword] < 0)) {\n310: errors.push(`${p}.${keyword}: expected a non-negative integer`);\n311: }\n312: }\n313: if (hasOwn(node, \"minimum\") && (typeof node.minimum !== \"number\" || !Number.isFinite(node.minimum))) {\n314: errors.push(`${p}.minimum: expected a finite number`);\n315: }\n316: if (hasOwn(node, \"pattern\")) {\n317: if (typeof node.pattern !== \"string\") {\n318: errors.push(`${p}.pattern: expected string`);\n319: } else {\n320: try {\n321: new RegExp(node.pattern);\n322: } catch (error) {\n323: errors.push(`${p}.pattern: invalid regular expression`);\n324: }\n325: }\n326: }\n327: if (hasOwn(node, \"uniqueItems\") && typeof node.uniqueItems !== \"boolean\") {\n328: errors.push(`${p}.uniqueItems: expected boolean`);\n329: }\n330: if (hasOwn(node, \"visibleContent\")) {\n331: if (typeof node.visibleContent !== \"boolean\") {\n332: errors.push(`${p}.visibleContent: expected boolean`);\n333: } else if (node.visibleContent === true && node.type !== \"string\") {\n334: errors.push(`${p}.visibleContent: requires type \"string\"`);\n335: }\n336: }\n337: if (hasOwn(node, \"oneOf\")) {\n338: if (!Array.isArray(node.oneOf) || node.oneOf.length === 0) {\n339: errors.push(`${p}.oneOf: expected a non-empty array`);\n340: } else {\n341: node.oneOf.forEach((branch, index) => check(branch, `${p}.oneOf[${index}]`));\n342: }\n343: }\n344: }\n345: \n346: check(schema, location);\n347: return errors;\n348: }\n349: \n350: function findDiscriminator(schema) {\n351: if (!hasOwn(schema, \"properties\") || typeof schema.properties !== \"object\") return null;\n352: for (const key of Object.keys(schema.properties)) {\n353: const subSchema = schema.properties[key];\n354: if (subSchema && typeof subSchema === \"object\" && hasOwn(subSchema, \"const\")) {\n355: return { key, value: subSchema.const };\n356: }\n357: }\n358: return null;\n359: }\n360: \n361: function validate(value, schema, p, errors) {\n362: if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) return;\n363: if (hasOwn(schema, \"oneOf\")) {\n364: const results = schema.oneOf.map((branch) => collectUnchecked(value, branch, p));\n365: const passingIndexes = results\n366: .map((branchErrors, index) => branchErrors.length === 0 ? index : -1)\n367: .filter((index) => index !== -1);\n368: \n369: if (passingIndexes.length !== 1) {\n370: errors.push(`${p}: must match exactly one schema in oneOf; matched ${passingIndexes.length}`);\n371: if (passingIndexes.length === 0 && value !== null && typeof value === \"object\" && !Array.isArray(value)) {\n372: const matchingDiscriminators = schema.oneOf\n373: .map((branch, index) => ({ discriminator: findDiscriminator(branch), index }))\n374: .filter(({ discriminator }) => discriminator && hasOwn(value, discriminator.key) && deepEqual(value[discriminator.key], discriminator.value));\n375: if (matchingDiscriminators.length === 1) {\n376: errors.push(...results[matchingDiscriminators[0].index]);\n377: }\n378: }\n379: }\n380: }\n381: \n382: if (hasOwn(schema, \"const\") && !deepEqual(value, schema.const)) {\n383: errors.push(`${p}: must equal ${safeQuote(schema.const)}, got ${safeQuote(value)}`);\n384: }\n385: if (hasOwn(schema, \"enum\") && !schema.enum.some((allowed) => deepEqual(value, allowed))) {\n386: const allowed = schema.enum.map(safeQuote).join(\", \");\n387: errors.push(`${p}: invalid value ${safeQuote(value)} (expected one of ${allowed})`);\n388: }\n389: \n390: if (hasOwn(schema, \"type\") && typeOf(value) !== schema.type && !(schema.type === \"integer\" && typeOf(value) === \"number\" && Number.isInteger(value))) {\n391: errors.push(`${p}: expected ${schema.type}, got ${typeOf(value)}`);\n392: return;\n393: }\n394: \n395: if (typeOf(value) === \"object\") {\n396: for (const req of hasOwn(schema, \"required\") ? schema.required : []) {\n397: if (!hasOwn(value, req)) errors.push(`${p}: missing required field ${safeQuote(req)}`);\n398: }\n399: for (const key of Object.keys(value)) {\n400: if (hasOwn(schema, \"properties\") && hasOwn(schema.properties, key)) {\n401: validate(value[key], schema.properties[key], propertyPath(p, key), errors);\n402: } else if (hasOwn(schema, \"additionalProperties\") && schema.additionalProperties === false) {\n403: errors.push(`${p}: unexpected field ${safeQuote(key)}`);\n404: }\n405: }\n406: }\n407: \n408: if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n409: if (hasOwn(schema, \"minItems\") && value.length < schema.minItems) {\n410: errors.push(`${p}: must have at least ${schema.minItems} item(s), got ${value.length}`);\n411: }\n412: if (hasOwn(schema, \"uniqueItems\") && schema.uniqueItems === true) {\n413: const seen = new Set();\n414: let setBytes = 0;\n415: for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n416: let canonical;\n417: try {\n418: canonical = canonicalKey(value[i]);\n419: } catch (error) {\n420: errors.push(`${p}[${i}]: ${error.message}`);\n421: break;\n422: }\n423: if (seen.has(canonical.key)) {\n424: errors.push(`${p}: items must be unique; duplicate at index ${i}`);\n425: continue;\n426: }\n427: setBytes += canonical.bytes;\n428: if (setBytes > LIMITS.uniqueSetBytes) {\n429: errors.push(`${p}: canonical uniqueness set exceeds ${LIMITS.uniqueSetBytes} byte limit`);\n430: break;\n431: }\n432: seen.add(canonical.key);\n433: }\n434: }\n435: if (hasOwn(schema, \"items\")) {\n436: value.forEach((item, index) => validate(item, schema.items, `${p}[${index}]`, errors));\n437: }\n438: }\n439: \n440: if (typeof value === \"string\") {\n441: if (hasOwn(schema, \"minLength\") && codePointLength(value) < schema.minLength) {\n442: errors.push(`${p}: must have at least ${schema.minLength} character(s)`);\n443: }\n444: if (schema.visibleContent === true) {\n445: if (!hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value)) {\n446: errors.push(`${p}: must contain only valid Unicode scalar values`);\n447: } else if (!VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value)) {\n448: errors.push(`${p}: must contain a visible character`);\n449: }\n450: }\n451: if (hasOwn(schema, \"pattern\") && !(new RegExp(schema.pattern).test(value))) {\n452: errors.push(`${p}: must match pattern ${JSON.stringify(schema.pattern)}`);\n453: }\n454: }\n455: \n456: if (typeof value === \"number\" && hasOwn(schema, \"minimum\") && value < schema.minimum) {\n457: errors.push(`${p}: must be at least ${schema.minimum}, got ${value}`);\n458: }\n459: }\n460: \n461: function collectUnchecked(value, schema, p) {\n462: const errors = createErrorList();\n463: validate(value, schema, p, errors);\n464: return errors;\n465: }\n466: \n467: function collect(value, schema, p = \"$data\") {\n468: const limitErrors = collectDataLimitErrors(value, p);\n469: if (limitErrors.length > 0) return limitErrors;\n470: return collectUnchecked(value, schema, p);\n471: }\n472: \n473: function isSafeRelativeSourcePath(value) {\n474: if (typeof value !== \"string\" || value.length === 0 || !hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) || value.trim() !== value || PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) || value.includes(\"\\\\\") || value.includes(\":\")) return false;\n475: if (path.posix.isAbsolute(value) || path.win32.isAbsolute(value) || /^[A-Za-z]:/.test(value) || value.startsWith(\"~\")) return false;\n476: const segments = value.split(\"/\");\n477: return segments.every((segment) =>\n478: segment !== \"\" &&\n479: segment !== \".\" &&\n480: segment !== \"..\" &&\n481: !/[ .]$/u.test(segment) &&\n482: !WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT.test(segment));\n483: }\n484: \n485: function collectFindingSemanticErrors(findings) {\n486: const errors = createErrorList();\n487: if (!Array.isArray(findings)) return errors;\n488: \n489: const fingerprints = new Map();\n490: let previousFingerprint = null;\n491: findings.forEach((finding, index) => {\n492: if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) return;\n493: if (!finding || typeof finding !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(finding)) return;\n494: const base = `$[${index}]`;\n495: \n496: if (hasOwn(finding, \"fingerprint\") && typeof finding.fingerprint === \"string\") {\n497: if (fingerprints.has(finding.fingerprint)) {\n498: errors.push(`${base}.fingerprint: duplicate of $[${fingerprints.get(finding.fingerprint)}].fingerprint`);\n499: } else {\n500: fingerprints.set(finding.fingerprint, index);\n501: }\n502: if (previousFingerprint !== null && previousFingerprint > finding.fingerprint) {\n503: errors.push(`${base}.fingerprint: findings must be sorted lexicographically`);\n504: }\n505: previousFingerprint = finding.fingerprint;\n506: }\n507: \n508: for (const field of [\"trace\", \"evidence\"]) {\n509: if (!hasOwn(finding, field) || !Array.isArray(finding[field])) continue;\n510: finding[field].forEach((entry, entryIndex) => {\n511: if (!entry || typeof entry !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(entry)) return;\n512: if (hasOwn(entry, \"line\") && (!Number.isInteger(entry.line) || entry.line < 1)) {\n513: errors.push(`${base}.${field}[${entryIndex}].line: must be a positive integer`);\n514: }\n515: if (hasOwn(entry, \"file\") && !isSafeRelativeSourcePath(entry.file)) {\n516: errors.push(`${base}.${field}[${entryIndex}].file: must be a safe repository-relative source path`);\n517: }\n518: });\n519: }\n520: if (finding.remediation && Array.isArray(finding.remediation.code_changes)) {\n521: finding.remediation.code_changes.forEach((change, changeIndex) => {\n522: if (change && hasOwn(change, \"file_name\") && !isSafeRelativeSourcePath(change.file_name)) {\n523: errors.push(`${base}.remediation.code_changes[${changeIndex}].file_name: must be a safe repository-relative source path`);\n524: }\n525: });\n526: }\n527: \n528: if (Array.isArray(finding.trace) && finding.trace.length === 1) {\n529: const kind = finding.trace[0] && finding.trace[0].kind;\n530: if (kind !== \"entrypoint\" && kind !== \"sink\") {\n531: errors.push(`${base}.trace[0].kind: a one-line trace must be \"entrypoint\" or \"sink\"`);\n532: }\n533: } else if (Array.isArray(finding.trace) && finding.trace.length > 1) {\n534: const last = finding.trace.length - 1;\n535: if (finding.trace[0] && finding.trace[0].kind !== \"entrypoint\") {\n536: errors.push(`${base}.trace[0].kind: must be \"entrypoint\", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[0].kind)}`);\n537: }\n538: if (finding.trace[last] && finding.trace[last].kind !== \"sink\") {\n539: errors.push(`${base}.trace[${last}].kind: must be \"sink\", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[last].kind)}`);\n540: }\n541: for (let traceIndex = 1; traceIndex < last; traceIndex++) {\n542: if (finding.trace[traceIndex] && finding.trace[traceIndex].kind !== \"propagation\") {\n543: errors.push(`${base}.trace[${traceIndex}].kind: must be \"propagation\", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[traceIndex].kind)}`);\n544: }\n545: }\n546: }\n547: \n548: const verdict = finding.verdict;\n549: if (verdict === \"confirmed\") {\n550: for (const forbidden of [\"claimed_root_cause\", \"blockers\", \"validation_plan\", \"reason\"]) {\n551: if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);\n552: }\n553: if (!finding.execution || typeof finding.execution !== \"object\" || typeof finding.execution.observed_result !== \"string\" || !hasVisibleProse(finding.execution.observed_result)) {\n554: errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding requires a visible execution observed_result`);\n555: }\n556: if (!finding.remediation || typeof finding.remediation !== \"object\" || typeof finding.remediation.strategy !== \"string\" || !hasVisibleProse(finding.remediation.strategy)) {\n557: errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding requires visible remediation`);\n558: }\n559: const overall = finding.severity && finding.severity.overall_severity;\n560: const impact = finding.severity && finding.severity.impact && finding.severity.impact.score;\n561: if (SEVERITY_RANK.has(overall) && SEVERITY_RANK.has(impact) && SEVERITY_RANK.get(overall) > SEVERITY_RANK.get(impact)) {\n562: errors.push(`${base}.severity.overall_severity: cannot exceed demonstrated impact ${safeQuote(impact)}`);\n563: }\n564: } else if (verdict === \"needs_validation\") {\n565: if (hasOwn(finding, \"severity\")) errors.push(`${base}: needs_validation finding must not contain \"severity\"`);\n566: for (const forbidden of [\"execution\", \"remediation\", \"reason\", \"root_cause\"]) {\n567: if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: needs_validation finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);\n568: }\n569: const plan = finding.validation_plan;\n570: const hasLocalPlan = plan && typeof plan.local === \"string\" && hasVisibleProse(plan.local);\n571: const hasDeploymentPlan = plan && typeof plan.deployment === \"string\" && hasVisibleProse(plan.deployment);\n572: if (!hasLocalPlan && !hasDeploymentPlan) {\n573: errors.push(`${base}.validation_plan: requires at least one visible local or deployment plan`);\n574: }\n575: } else if (verdict === \"rejected\") {\n576: for (const forbidden of [\"severity\", \"execution\", \"remediation\", \"blockers\", \"validation_plan\", \"root_cause\"]) {\n577: if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: rejected finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);\n578: }\n579: }\n580: });\n581: \n582: return errors;\n583: }\n584: \n585: function validateDocument(findings, schema) {\n586: const schemaErrors = collectSchemaErrors(schema);\n587: if (schemaErrors.length > 0) return schemaErrors;\n588: const limitErrors = collectDataLimitErrors(findings, \"$\");\n589: if (limitErrors.length > 0) return limitErrors;\n590: const errors = collectUnchecked(findings, schema, \"$\");\n591: if (errors.length < LIMITS.validationErrors) {\n592: errors.push(...collectFindingSemanticErrors(findings));\n593: }\n594: return errors;\n595: }\n596: \n597: function loadSchema(schemaPath) {\n598: const schema = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(schemaPath, \"utf8\"));\n599: const errors = collectSchemaErrors(schema);\n600: if (errors.length > 0) throw new Error(`unsupported or invalid report schema:\\n${errors.join(\"\\n\")}`);\n601: return schema;\n602: }\n603: \n604: function readFileWithinLimit(file) {\n605: const noFollow = fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW;\n606: const nonBlock = fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK;\n607: if (!Number.isInteger(noFollow) || noFollow === 0 || !Number.isInteger(nonBlock) || nonBlock === 0) {\n608: throw new SafeInputError(\"OS no-follow and nonblocking input protection is unavailable\");\n609: }\n610: \n611: let descriptor;\n612: try {\n613: descriptor = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | noFollow | nonBlock);\n614: } catch (error) {\n615: if (error && (error.code === \"ELOOP\" || error.code === \"EMLINK\")) {\n616: throw new SafeInputError(\"input must not be a symlink\");\n617: }\n618: throw error;\n619: }\n620: try {\n621: const stat = fs.fstatSync(descriptor);\n622: if (!stat.isFile()) {\n623: throw new SafeInputError(\"input must be a regular file\");\n624: }\n625: if (stat.size > LIMITS.inputBytes) {\n626: throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.inputBytes} byte limit`);\n627: }\n628: \n629: const chunks = [];\n630: const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);\n631: let bytesRead = 0;\n632: while (true) {\n633: const count = fs.readSync(descriptor, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);\n634: if (count === 0) break;\n635: bytesRead += count;\n636: if (bytesRead > LIMITS.inputBytes) {\n637: throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.inputBytes} byte limit`);\n638: }\n639: chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));\n640: }\n641: try {\n642: return UTF8_DECODER.decode(Buffer.concat(chunks, bytesRead));\n643: } catch {\n644: throw new SafeInputError(\"input is not valid UTF-8\");\n645: }\n646: } finally {\n647: fs.closeSync(descriptor);\n648: }\n649: }\n650: \n651: function enforceJsonTextLimits(contents) {\n652: const containers = [];\n653: let inString = false;\n654: let escaped = false;\n655: \n656: function markArrayItem() {\n657: const container = containers[containers.length - 1];\n658: if (!container || container.type !== \"array\" || !container.expectsItem) return;\n659: container.expectsItem = false;\n660: container.items++;\n661: if (container.items > LIMITS.arrayItems) {\n662: throw new JsonStructureError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.arrayItems} item array limit`);\n663: }\n664: }\n665: \n666: for (let index = 0; index < contents.length; index++) {\n667: const character = contents[index];\n668: if (inString) {\n669: if (escaped) {\n670: escaped = false;\n671: } else if (character === \"\\\\\") {\n672: escaped = true;\n673: } else if (character === \"\\\"\") {\n674: inString = false;\n675: }\n676: continue;\n677: }\n678: \n679: if (character === \"\\\"\") {\n680: markArrayItem();\n681: inString = true;\n682: } else if (character === \"[\" || character === \"{\") {\n683: markArrayItem();\n684: if (containers.length >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {\n685: throw new JsonStructureError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.nestingDepth} level nesting depth limit`);\n686: }\n687: containers.push({\n688: type: character === \"[\" ? \"array\" : \"object\",\n689: expectsItem: character === \"[\",\n690: items: 0,\n691: });\n692: } else if (character === \"]\" || character === \"}\") {\n693: containers.pop();\n694: } else if (character === \",\") {\n695: const container = containers[containers.length - 1];\n696: if (container && container.type === \"array\") container.expectsItem = true;\n697: } else if (!/\\s/.test(character)) {\n698: markArrayItem();\n699: }\n700: }\n701: }\n702: \n703: function run(file) {\n704: if (!file) {\n705: console.error(\"Usage: node validate-findings.cjs \");\n706: return 1;\n707: }\n708: \n709: let schema;\n710: try {\n711: schema = loadSchema(path.join(__dirname, \"report-schema.json\"));\n712: } catch (error) {\n713: console.error(\"Failed to load report-schema.json:\", error.message);\n714: return 1;\n715: }\n716: \n717: let contents;\n718: try {\n719: contents = readFileWithinLimit(file);\n720: } catch (error) {\n721: const reason = error instanceof SafeInputError ? error.message : \"input could not be opened or read safely\";\n722: console.error(`Failed to read findings JSON: ${reason}`);\n723: return 1;\n724: }\n725: \n726: try {\n727: enforceJsonTextLimits(contents);\n728: } catch (error) {\n729: const reason = error instanceof JsonStructureError ? error.message : \"invalid JSON structure\";\n730: console.error(`Failed to parse findings JSON: ${reason}`);\n731: return 1;\n732: }\n733: \n734: let findings;\n735: try {\n736: findings = JSON.parse(contents);\n737: } catch {\n738: console.error(\"Failed to parse findings JSON: invalid JSON syntax\");\n739: return 1;\n740: }\n741: \n742: let errors;\n743: try {\n744: errors = validateDocument(findings, schema);\n745: } catch {\n746: console.error(\"Failed to validate findings JSON: unexpected validation error\");\n747: return 1;\n748: }\n749: for (const message of errors) console.error(\"ERROR:\", escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(message));\n750: if (errors.length > 0) {\n751: const cap = errors.length === LIMITS.validationErrors ? `; output capped at ${LIMITS.validationErrors}` : \"\";\n752: console.error(`FAIL: ${errors.length} validation error(s)${cap}`);\n753: return 1;\n754: }\n755: console.log(`PASS: ${findings.length} findings valid`);\n756: return 0;\n757: }\n758: \n759: module.exports = {\n760: LIMITS,\n761: PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER,\n762: UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER,\n763: VISIBLE_CONTENT,\n764: WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT,\n765: collect,\n766: collectFindingSemanticErrors,\n767: collectSchemaErrors,\n768: hasVisibleProse,\n769: isSafeRelativeSourcePath,\n770: validateDocument,\n771: };\n772: \n773: if (require.main === module) process.exit(run(process.argv[2]));\n\n(End of file - total 773 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#!/usr/bin/env node\n\n/**\n * Validates findings.json against report-schema.json.\n * Usage: node validate-findings.cjs \n *\n * This is a dependency-free interpreter for the JSON Schema keywords used by\n * report-schema.json, plus finding-specific checks that are clearer in code.\n */\n\nconst fs = require(\"fs\");\nconst path = require(\"path\");\nconst { TextDecoder } = require(\"util\");\n\nconst hasOwn = (value, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key);\nconst SUPPORTED_TYPES = new Set([\"object\", \"array\", \"string\", \"integer\", \"number\", \"boolean\", \"null\"]);\nconst SUPPORTED_KEYWORDS = new Set([\n \"$comment\",\n \"additionalProperties\",\n \"const\",","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs","time":{"start":1793149259277,"end":1793149259289}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me check the validate-findings.cjs script to understand how to validate the findings.json.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180064e0a001wsh07m3fLGadny","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180063ac1001kCTqQBBaNvirhr"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149261883,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180065837001rSP7mZFcsY86C3","messageID":"msg_180064e3a001AnRBcRSOm8Ti3I","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149334225,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-d1a95ca3-419d-4404-b955-18a6d6ce145f","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"content":"[\n {\n \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"IDOR in /delete endpoint allows deleting any user's notes\",\n \"description\": \"The POST /delete endpoint accepts a note ID parameter and deletes the note without verifying the requesting user owns it. An authenticated user can delete notes belonging to other users by specifying their note IDs.\",\n \"root_cause\": \"delete_note() function at line 32-35 omits the owner parameter and WHERE clause check that is present in get_note() at line 28. The POST /delete handler at line 82 does not pass the authenticated user's ID to delete_note().\",\n \"intended_behavior\": \"Users should only be able to delete their own notes. The delete operation must verify note ownership before deletion, consistent with the read pattern in get_note().\",\n \"trace\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 81,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_POST\",\n \"description\": \"POST /delete endpoint receives note ID from query string without ownership context\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 82,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_POST\",\n \"description\": \"User-controlled ID passed to delete_note() without authenticated user context\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 34,\n \"scope\": \"delete_note\",\n \"description\": \"SQL DELETE executes with only note ID filter, no owner verification\"\n }\n ],\n \"evidence\": [\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 32,\n \"description\": \"delete_note() function signature accepts only note_id, no user_id parameter\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 34,\n \"description\": \"SQL DELETE uses only id = ? filter, omitting owner = ? check\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 81,\n \"description\": \"POST /delete handler extracts id from query string\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 82,\n \"description\": \"delete_note() called with user-controlled id, authenticated user not passed\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 28,\n \"description\": \"get_note() correctly uses parameterized query with both id and owner checks for comparison\"\n }\n ],\n \"conditions\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"data_state\",\n \"description\": \"Victim note must exist in database with known ID\"\n }\n ],\n \"execution\": {\n \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n \"payloads\": [\n \"POST /delete?id= with valid X-Session header\"\n ],\n \"instructions\": [\n \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n \"2. Create notes as two different users (requires manual DB setup or /login endpoint)\",\n \"3. Obtain session token for user A\",\n \"4. Send POST /delete?id= with X-Session: \",\n \"5. Verify user B's note is deleted\"\n ],\n \"observed_result\": \"User A's request deletes user B's note by ID, violating ownership boundary. The database row for user B's note is removed despite user A not owning it.\"\n },\n \"remediation\": {\n \"strategy\": \"Add owner parameter to delete_note() and verify ownership in the DELETE statement, mirroring the get_note() pattern.\",\n \"code_changes\": [\n {\n \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"fixed_code\": \"def delete_note(user_id, note_id):\\n con = db()\\n con.execute(\\\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ? AND owner = ?\\\", (note_id, user_id))\\n con.commit()\"\n },\n {\n \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"fixed_code\": \" if url.path == \\\"/delete\\\":\\n delete_note(user, int(qs.get(\\\"id\\\", \\\"0\\\")))\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"severity\": {\n \"likelihood\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this by guessing or enumerating note IDs. No special conditions beyond valid session.\"\n },\n \"impact\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Full data deletion across user boundaries. Victims lose their notes permanently with no recovery mechanism shown.\"\n },\n \"overall_severity\": \"high\"\n },\n \"confidence\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Source code clearly shows missing owner check in delete_note() vs. present check in get_note(). Independent verification confirmed the boundary violation.\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"Path traversal in /attachment endpoint allows arbitrary file read\",\n \"description\": \"The GET /attachment endpoint passes the user-controlled 'name' parameter directly to os.path.join without path validation, allowing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.\",\n \"root_cause\": \"read_attachment() at lines 38-41 uses os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name) without any path containment check. The resulting path is passed directly to open(). In contrast, read_avatar() at lines 44-49 correctly uses os.path.abspath() and a startswith check to prevent traversal.\",\n \"intended_behavior\": \"Users should only read files within the configured FILES_DIR directory. Path traversal sequences must be blocked.\",\n \"trace\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 69,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"GET /attachment endpoint extracts 'name' query parameter directly from request\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 70,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"Raw 'name' value passed to read_attachment() without validation\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 40,\n \"scope\": \"read_attachment\",\n \"description\": \"os.path.join() combines FILES_DIR with user input; open() reads resulting path without containment check\"\n }\n ],\n \"evidence\": [\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 38,\n \"description\": \"read_attachment() function definition accepts name parameter\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 39,\n \"description\": \"os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name) without path validation\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 40,\n \"description\": \"open(path, \\\"rb\\\") reads file without verifying path stays within FILES_DIR\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 45,\n \"description\": \"read_avatar() correctly uses os.path.abspath() and startswith check for comparison\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 70,\n \"description\": \"GET /attachment handler passes raw qs.get('name', '') to read_attachment()\"\n }\n ],\n \"conditions\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"system_configuration\",\n \"description\": \"Server process must have read access to target files outside FILES_DIR\"\n }\n ],\n \"execution\": {\n \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n \"payloads\": [\n \"GET /attachment?name=../../etc/passwd\",\n \"GET /attachment?name=../app/server.py\",\n \"GET /attachment?name=../../../../proc/self/environ\"\n ],\n \"instructions\": [\n \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n \"2. Obtain a valid session token (requires /login endpoint or manual SESSIONS population)\",\n \"3. Send GET /attachment?name=../../etc/passwd with X-Session header\",\n \"4. Observe server file contents returned in response body\"\n ],\n \"observed_result\": \"Server returns contents of /etc/passwd (or any file readable by the server process) in the HTTP response body. The path traversal sequence ../../ escapes FILES_DIR and resolves to the target system file.\"\n },\n \"remediation\": {\n \"strategy\": \"Add path containment validation to read_attachment() mirroring the read_avatar() pattern: resolve absolute path and verify it starts with FILES_DIR.\",\n \"code_changes\": [\n {\n \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"fixed_code\": \"def read_attachment(name):\\n path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name))\\n if not path.startswith(FILES_DIR + os.sep):\\n raise PermissionError(\\\"bad path\\\")\\n with open(path, \\\"rb\\\") as f:\\n return f.read()\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"severity\": {\n \"likelihood\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this via simple query parameter manipulation. No special prerequisites beyond valid session.\"\n },\n \"impact\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Arbitrary file read on server filesystem. Can expose /etc/passwd, source code, configuration files, environment variables, database files, SSH keys, and other secrets.\"\n },\n \"overall_severity\": \"high\"\n },\n \"confidence\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Source code shows complete absence of path validation in read_attachment() while read_avatar() demonstrates the correct pattern in the same file. Independent verification confirmed exploitability.\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"SQL injection in /search endpoint via unsanitized query parameter\",\n \"description\": \"The GET /search endpoint interpolates the user-controlled 'q' parameter directly into a SQL query string using Python string formatting, allowing arbitrary SQL injection. An authenticated user can inject SQL to bypass ownership filters, read all users' notes, extract schema, or modify data.\",\n \"root_cause\": \"search_notes() at line 22 uses string interpolation: q = \\\"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\\\" % (user_id, term). The term variable comes from the 'q' query parameter with no escaping or parameterization. In contrast, get_note() at line 28 correctly uses parameterized queries with ? placeholders.\",\n \"intended_behavior\": \"Search should only return notes matching the search term for the authenticated user. User input must be treated as data, not executable SQL.\",\n \"trace\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 65,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"GET /search endpoint extracts 'q' query parameter from request\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 66,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"Raw 'q' value passed to search_notes() as term parameter\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 23,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the constructed query string\"\n }\n ],\n \"evidence\": [\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 20,\n \"description\": \"search_notes() function definition accepts term parameter\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"description\": \"SQL query built via string interpolation with %s, placing term inside LIKE pattern\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 23,\n \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the interpolated query string\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 28,\n \"description\": \"get_note() correctly uses parameterized query with ? placeholders for comparison\"\n },\n {\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 66,\n \"description\": \"GET /search handler passes raw qs.get('q', '') to search_notes()\"\n }\n ],\n \"conditions\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n }\n ],\n \"execution\": {\n \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n \"payloads\": [\n \"GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes--\",\n \"GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master--\",\n \"GET /search?q='; DROP TABLE notes;--\"\n ],\n \"instructions\": [\n \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n \"2. Populate database with notes from multiple users (manual DB setup required)\",\n \"3. Obtain a valid session token\",\n \"4. Send GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes-- with X-Session header\",\n \"5. Observe response contains notes from all users, not just the authenticated user\"\n ],\n \"observed_result\": \"The UNION injection bypasses the owner filter and returns all notes from all users. The injected SQL executes with the same privileges as the application, allowing data exfiltration, schema extraction, and potential data modification or destruction.\"\n },\n \"remediation\": {\n \"strategy\": \"Replace string interpolation with parameterized query using ? placeholders, consistent with get_note() pattern.\",\n \"code_changes\": [\n {\n \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"fixed_code\": \"def search_notes(user_id, term):\\n q = \\\"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = ? AND title LIKE ?\\\"\\n return db().execute(q, (user_id, f\\\"%{term}%\\\")).fetchall()\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"severity\": {\n \"likelihood\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this via the search query parameter. No special conditions beyond valid session. The vulnerability is trivially exploitable.\"\n },\n \"impact\": {\n \"score\": \"critical\",\n \"reason\": \"Full database access: read all users' notes, extract schema, modify/delete data, potential RCE via SQLite extensions. Complete loss of data confidentiality and integrity across all users.\"\n },\n \"overall_severity\": \"critical\"\n },\n \"confidence\": {\n \"score\": \"high\",\n \"reason\": \"Source code shows direct string interpolation into SQL with no escaping. The correct parameterized pattern exists in get_note() in the same file. Independent verification confirmed exploitability.\"\n }\n }\n]","filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json","time":{"start":1793149334205,"end":1793149334221}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I understand the schema. I need to create findings.json with the three confirmed findings, following the schema exactly. Let me create the findings.json file with all required fields for confirmed verdicts.\n\nKey requirements for confirmed findings:\n- verdict: \"confirmed\"\n- fingerprint: stable identifier (lexicographically sorted)\n- title, description, root_cause, intended_behavior\n- trace: array with entrypoint, propagation, sink\n- evidence: array with file, line, description\n- conditions: array with kind and description\n- execution: attacker_perspective, payloads, instructions, observed_result\n- remediation: strategy, code_changes\n- severity: likelihood, impact, overall_severity\n- confidence: score, reason\n\nLet me create the findings.json with the three verified findings, sorted lexicographically by fingerprint.\n\nThe fingerprints should be sorted:\n1. idor-delete-endpoint\n2. path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\n3. sql-injection-search-endpoint\n\nLet me build this carefully.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800772b2001oy98W6bIOzDxPx","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180064e3a001AnRBcRSOm8Ti3I"}}
{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1793149334247,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_1800772d0001rnlaXl9OoG6JGB","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","messageID":"msg_180064e3a001AnRBcRSOm8Ti3I","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":48919,"input":19167,"output":3579,"reasoning":253,"cache":{"write":0,"read":25920}},"cost":0}}
{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149336945,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180077d6e001RfaTieEWmPl9I6","messageID":"msg_1800772f8001uZjSW3nL0QwuAd","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149338012,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-7c3fdb00-10d3-4605-959e-2051d7b8c626","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Validate findings.json against schema","command":"node /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json"},"output":"ERROR: $[2].trace[2].kind: must be \"propagation\", got \"sink\"\nFAIL: 1 validation error(s)\n","metadata":{"output":"ERROR: $[2].trace[2].kind: must be \"propagation\", got \"sink\"\nFAIL: 1 validation error(s)\n","exit":1,"description":"Validate findings.json against schema","truncated":false},"title":"Validate findings.json against schema","time":{"start":1793149338007,"end":1793149338010}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now I need to validate the findings.json using the validate-findings.cjs script.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180078105001hzDiG97g5gMyMW","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_1800772f8001uZjSW3nL0QwuAd"}}
{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1793149338020,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18007819b001N5EIU0PuCzOcnZ","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","messageID":"msg_1800772f8001uZjSW3nL0QwuAd","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":49078,"input":48940,"output":118,"reasoning":20,"cache":{"write":0,"read":0}},"cost":0}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149342008,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-4c37da5a-a8f7-4afb-8e5d-4cbd12089ee5","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\nfile\n\n1: [\n2: {\n3: \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n4: \"fingerprint\": \"idor-delete-endpoint\",\n5: \"title\": \"IDOR in /delete endpoint allows deleting any user's notes\",\n6: \"description\": \"The POST /delete endpoint accepts a note ID parameter and deletes the note without verifying the requesting user owns it. An authenticated user can delete notes belonging to other users by specifying their note IDs.\",\n7: \"root_cause\": \"delete_note() function at line 32-35 omits the owner parameter and WHERE clause check that is present in get_note() at line 28. The POST /delete handler at line 82 does not pass the authenticated user's ID to delete_note().\",\n8: \"intended_behavior\": \"Users should only be able to delete their own notes. The delete operation must verify note ownership before deletion, consistent with the read pattern in get_note().\",\n9: \"trace\": [\n10: {\n11: \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n12: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n13: \"line\": 81,\n14: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_POST\",\n15: \"description\": \"POST /delete endpoint receives note ID from query string without ownership context\"\n16: },\n17: {\n18: \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n19: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n20: \"line\": 82,\n21: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_POST\",\n22: \"description\": \"User-controlled ID passed to delete_note() without authenticated user context\"\n23: },\n24: {\n25: \"kind\": \"sink\",\n26: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n27: \"line\": 34,\n28: \"scope\": \"delete_note\",\n29: \"description\": \"SQL DELETE executes with only note ID filter, no owner verification\"\n30: }\n31: ],\n32: \"evidence\": [\n33: {\n34: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n35: \"line\": 32,\n36: \"description\": \"delete_note() function signature accepts only note_id, no user_id parameter\"\n37: },\n38: {\n39: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n40: \"line\": 34,\n41: \"description\": \"SQL DELETE uses only id = ? filter, omitting owner = ? check\"\n42: },\n43: {\n44: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n45: \"line\": 81,\n46: \"description\": \"POST /delete handler extracts id from query string\"\n47: },\n48: {\n49: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n50: \"line\": 82,\n51: \"description\": \"delete_note() called with user-controlled id, authenticated user not passed\"\n52: },\n53: {\n54: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n55: \"line\": 28,\n56: \"description\": \"get_note() correctly uses parameterized query with both id and owner checks for comparison\"\n57: }\n58: ],\n59: \"conditions\": [\n60: {\n61: \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n62: \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n63: },\n64: {\n65: \"kind\": \"data_state\",\n66: \"description\": \"Victim note must exist in database with known ID\"\n67: }\n68: ],\n69: \"execution\": {\n70: \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n71: \"payloads\": [\n72: \"POST /delete?id= with valid X-Session header\"\n73: ],\n74: \"instructions\": [\n75: \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n76: \"2. Create notes as two different users (requires manual DB setup or /login endpoint)\",\n77: \"3. Obtain session token for user A\",\n78: \"4. Send POST /delete?id= with X-Session: \",\n79: \"5. Verify user B's note is deleted\"\n80: ],\n81: \"observed_result\": \"User A's request deletes user B's note by ID, violating ownership boundary. The database row for user B's note is removed despite user A not owning it.\"\n82: },\n83: \"remediation\": {\n84: \"strategy\": \"Add owner parameter to delete_note() and verify ownership in the DELETE statement, mirroring the get_note() pattern.\",\n85: \"code_changes\": [\n86: {\n87: \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n88: \"fixed_code\": \"def delete_note(user_id, note_id):\\n con = db()\\n con.execute(\\\"DELETE FROM notes WHERE id = ? AND owner = ?\\\", (note_id, user_id))\\n con.commit()\"\n89: },\n90: {\n91: \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n92: \"fixed_code\": \" if url.path == \\\"/delete\\\":\\n delete_note(user, int(qs.get(\\\"id\\\", \\\"0\\\")))\"\n93: }\n94: ]\n95: },\n96: \"severity\": {\n97: \"likelihood\": {\n98: \"score\": \"high\",\n99: \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this by guessing or enumerating note IDs. No special conditions beyond valid session.\"\n100: },\n101: \"impact\": {\n102: \"score\": \"high\",\n103: \"reason\": \"Full data deletion across user boundaries. Victims lose their notes permanently with no recovery mechanism shown.\"\n104: },\n105: \"overall_severity\": \"high\"\n106: },\n107: \"confidence\": {\n108: \"score\": \"high\",\n109: \"reason\": \"Source code clearly shows missing owner check in delete_note() vs. present check in get_note(). Independent verification confirmed the boundary violation.\"\n110: }\n111: },\n112: {\n113: \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n114: \"fingerprint\": \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\",\n115: \"title\": \"Path traversal in /attachment endpoint allows arbitrary file read\",\n116: \"description\": \"The GET /attachment endpoint passes the user-controlled 'name' parameter directly to os.path.join without path validation, allowing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.\",\n117: \"root_cause\": \"read_attachment() at lines 38-41 uses os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name) without any path containment check. The resulting path is passed directly to open(). In contrast, read_avatar() at lines 44-49 correctly uses os.path.abspath() and a startswith check to prevent traversal.\",\n118: \"intended_behavior\": \"Users should only read files within the configured FILES_DIR directory. Path traversal sequences must be blocked.\",\n119: \"trace\": [\n120: {\n121: \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n122: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n123: \"line\": 69,\n124: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n125: \"description\": \"GET /attachment endpoint extracts 'name' query parameter directly from request\"\n126: },\n127: {\n128: \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n129: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n130: \"line\": 70,\n131: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n132: \"description\": \"Raw 'name' value passed to read_attachment() without validation\"\n133: },\n134: {\n135: \"kind\": \"sink\",\n136: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n137: \"line\": 40,\n138: \"scope\": \"read_attachment\",\n139: \"description\": \"os.path.join() combines FILES_DIR with user input; open() reads resulting path without containment check\"\n140: }\n141: ],\n142: \"evidence\": [\n143: {\n144: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n145: \"line\": 38,\n146: \"description\": \"read_attachment() function definition accepts name parameter\"\n147: },\n148: {\n149: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n150: \"line\": 39,\n151: \"description\": \"os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name) without path validation\"\n152: },\n153: {\n154: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n155: \"line\": 40,\n156: \"description\": \"open(path, \\\"rb\\\") reads file without verifying path stays within FILES_DIR\"\n157: },\n158: {\n159: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n160: \"line\": 45,\n161: \"description\": \"read_avatar() correctly uses os.path.abspath() and startswith check for comparison\"\n162: },\n163: {\n164: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n165: \"line\": 70,\n166: \"description\": \"GET /attachment handler passes raw qs.get('name', '') to read_attachment()\"\n167: }\n168: ],\n169: \"conditions\": [\n170: {\n171: \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n172: \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n173: },\n174: {\n175: \"kind\": \"system_configuration\",\n176: \"description\": \"Server process must have read access to target files outside FILES_DIR\"\n177: }\n178: ],\n179: \"execution\": {\n180: \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n181: \"payloads\": [\n182: \"GET /attachment?name=../../etc/passwd\",\n183: \"GET /attachment?name=../app/server.py\",\n184: \"GET /attachment?name=../../../../proc/self/environ\"\n185: ],\n186: \"instructions\": [\n187: \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n188: \"2. Obtain a valid session token (requires /login endpoint or manual SESSIONS population)\",\n189: \"3. Send GET /attachment?name=../../etc/passwd with X-Session header\",\n190: \"4. Observe server file contents returned in response body\"\n191: ],\n192: \"observed_result\": \"Server returns contents of /etc/passwd (or any file readable by the server process) in the HTTP response body. The path traversal sequence ../../ escapes FILES_DIR and resolves to the target system file.\"\n193: },\n194: \"remediation\": {\n195: \"strategy\": \"Add path containment validation to read_attachment() mirroring the read_avatar() pattern: resolve absolute path and verify it starts with FILES_DIR.\",\n196: \"code_changes\": [\n197: {\n198: \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n199: \"fixed_code\": \"def read_attachment(name):\\n path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(FILES_DIR, name))\\n if not path.startswith(FILES_DIR + os.sep):\\n raise PermissionError(\\\"bad path\\\")\\n with open(path, \\\"rb\\\") as f:\\n return f.read()\"\n200: }\n201: ]\n202: },\n203: \"severity\": {\n204: \"likelihood\": {\n205: \"score\": \"high\",\n206: \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this via simple query parameter manipulation. No special prerequisites beyond valid session.\"\n207: },\n208: \"impact\": {\n209: \"score\": \"high\",\n210: \"reason\": \"Arbitrary file read on server filesystem. Can expose /etc/passwd, source code, configuration files, environment variables, database files, SSH keys, and other secrets.\"\n211: },\n212: \"overall_severity\": \"high\"\n213: },\n214: \"confidence\": {\n215: \"score\": \"high\",\n216: \"reason\": \"Source code shows complete absence of path validation in read_attachment() while read_avatar() demonstrates the correct pattern in the same file. Independent verification confirmed exploitability.\"\n217: }\n218: },\n219: {\n220: \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n221: \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n222: \"title\": \"SQL injection in /search endpoint via unsanitized query parameter\",\n223: \"description\": \"The GET /search endpoint interpolates the user-controlled 'q' parameter directly into a SQL query string using Python string formatting, allowing arbitrary SQL injection. An authenticated user can inject SQL to bypass ownership filters, read all users' notes, extract schema, or modify data.\",\n224: \"root_cause\": \"search_notes() at line 22 uses string interpolation: q = \\\"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = %d AND title LIKE '%%%s%%'\\\" % (user_id, term). The term variable comes from the 'q' query parameter with no escaping or parameterization. In contrast, get_note() at line 28 correctly uses parameterized queries with ? placeholders.\",\n225: \"intended_behavior\": \"Search should only return notes matching the search term for the authenticated user. User input must be treated as data, not executable SQL.\",\n226: \"trace\": [\n227: {\n228: \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n229: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n230: \"line\": 65,\n231: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n232: \"description\": \"GET /search endpoint extracts 'q' query parameter from request\"\n233: },\n234: {\n235: \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n236: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n237: \"line\": 66,\n238: \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n239: \"description\": \"Raw 'q' value passed to search_notes() as term parameter\"\n240: },\n241: {\n242: \"kind\": \"sink\",\n243: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n244: \"line\": 22,\n245: \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n246: \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n247: },\n248: {\n249: \"kind\": \"sink\",\n250: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n251: \"line\": 23,\n252: \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n253: \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the constructed query string\"\n254: }\n255: ],\n256: \"evidence\": [\n257: {\n258: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n259: \"line\": 20,\n260: \"description\": \"search_notes() function definition accepts term parameter\"\n261: },\n262: {\n263: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n264: \"line\": 22,\n265: \"description\": \"SQL query built via string interpolation with %s, placing term inside LIKE pattern\"\n266: },\n267: {\n268: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n269: \"line\": 23,\n270: \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the interpolated query string\"\n271: },\n272: {\n273: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n274: \"line\": 28,\n275: \"description\": \"get_note() correctly uses parameterized query with ? placeholders for comparison\"\n276: },\n277: {\n278: \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n279: \"line\": 66,\n280: \"description\": \"GET /search handler passes raw qs.get('q', '') to search_notes()\"\n281: }\n282: ],\n283: \"conditions\": [\n284: {\n285: \"kind\": \"authentication_level\",\n286: \"description\": \"Attacker must have a valid session token (X-Session header)\"\n287: }\n288: ],\n289: \"execution\": {\n290: \"attacker_perspective\": \"Authenticated user with valid session token\",\n291: \"payloads\": [\n292: \"GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes--\",\n293: \"GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master--\",\n294: \"GET /search?q='; DROP TABLE notes;--\"\n295: ],\n296: \"instructions\": [\n297: \"1. Start the server: python -m app.server\",\n298: \"2. Populate database with notes from multiple users (manual DB setup required)\",\n299: \"3. Obtain a valid session token\",\n300: \"4. Send GET /search?q=' UNION SELECT id, title FROM notes-- with X-Session header\",\n301: \"5. Observe response contains notes from all users, not just the authenticated user\"\n302: ],\n303: \"observed_result\": \"The UNION injection bypasses the owner filter and returns all notes from all users. The injected SQL executes with the same privileges as the application, allowing data exfiltration, schema extraction, and potential data modification or destruction.\"\n304: },\n305: \"remediation\": {\n306: \"strategy\": \"Replace string interpolation with parameterized query using ? placeholders, consistent with get_note() pattern.\",\n307: \"code_changes\": [\n308: {\n309: \"file_name\": \"app/server.py\",\n310: \"fixed_code\": \"def search_notes(user_id, term):\\n q = \\\"SELECT id, title FROM notes WHERE owner = ? AND title LIKE ?\\\"\\n return db().execute(q, (user_id, f\\\"%{term}%\\\")).fetchall()\"\n311: }\n312: ]\n313: },\n314: \"severity\": {\n315: \"likelihood\": {\n316: \"score\": \"high\",\n317: \"reason\": \"Any authenticated user can exploit this via the search query parameter. No special conditions beyond valid session. The vulnerability is trivially exploitable.\"\n318: },\n319: \"impact\": {\n320: \"score\": \"critical\",\n321: \"reason\": \"Full database access: read all users' notes, extract schema, modify/delete data, potential RCE via SQLite extensions. Complete loss of data confidentiality and integrity across all users.\"\n322: },\n323: \"overall_severity\": \"critical\"\n324: },\n325: \"confidence\": {\n326: \"score\": \"high\",\n327: \"reason\": \"Source code shows direct string interpolation into SQL with no escaping. The correct parameterized pattern exists in get_note() in the same file. Independent verification confirmed exploitability.\"\n328: }\n329: }\n330: ]\n\n(End of file - total 330 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"[\n {\n \"verdict\": \"confirmed\",\n \"fingerprint\": \"idor-delete-endpoint\",\n \"title\": \"IDOR in /delete endpoint allows deleting any user's notes\",\n \"description\": \"The POST /delete endpoint accepts a note ID parameter and deletes the note without verifying the requesting user owns it. An authenticated user can delete notes belonging to other users by specifying their note IDs.\",\n \"root_cause\": \"delete_note() function at line 32-35 omits the owner parameter and WHERE clause check that is present in get_note() at line 28. The POST /delete handler at line 82 does not pass the authenticated user's ID to delete_note().\",\n \"intended_behavior\": \"Users should only be able to delete their own notes. The delete operation must verify note ownership before deletion, consistent with the read pattern in get_note().\",\n \"trace\": [\n {\n \"kind\": \"entrypoint\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 81,\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_POST\",\n \"description\": \"POST /delete endpoint receives note ID from query string without ownership context\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 82,","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json","time":{"start":1793149341917,"end":1793149342004}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The trace validation requires that for traces with more than 2 entries, the middle ones must be \"propagation\" and the last must be \"sink\". Let me fix the SQL injection finding trace - it has 4 entries (entrypoint, propagation, sink, sink) but the last two are both sinks. I need to restructure it.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800790d60019KFPMslXneMmtk","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_1800781b5001wO1zB3IoBHfCXU"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149343832,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180079855001iGYNxKjyQfBx3z","messageID":"msg_180079156001NxWI32L6lsuWAC","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149355882,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"edit","callID":"call-42c2de20-48c0-4d91-ba62-b36f4ce53742","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"oldString":"{\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 23,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the constructed query string\"\n }","newString":"{\n \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n },\n {\n \"kind\": \"sink\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 23,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"db().execute(q) executes the constructed query string\"\n }","filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json"},"output":"Edit applied successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"diff":"Index: /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n===================================================================\n--- /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n+++ /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n@@ -238,9 +238,9 @@\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"Raw 'q' value passed to search_notes() as term parameter\"\n },\n {\n- \"kind\": \"sink\",\n+ \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n","filediff":{"file":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json","patch":"Index: /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n===================================================================\n--- /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n+++ /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json\n@@ -238,9 +238,9 @@\n \"scope\": \"Handler.do_GET\",\n \"description\": \"Raw 'q' value passed to search_notes() as term parameter\"\n },\n {\n- \"kind\": \"sink\",\n+ \"kind\": \"propagation\",\n \"file\": \"app/server.py\",\n \"line\": 22,\n \"scope\": \"search_notes\",\n \"description\": \"String formatting interpolates term directly into SQL query: '%%%s%%' % term\"\n","additions":1,"deletions":1},"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json","time":{"start":1793149355880,"end":1793149355882}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The issue is with the SQL injection finding's trace - it has 4 entries but the last two are both \"sink\" kinds. According to the validation logic, for traces with more than 2 entries:\n- trace[0] must be \"entrypoint\"\n- trace[last] must be \"sink\"\n- trace[1] through trace[last-1] must be \"propagation\"\n\nSo I need to change the third entry (index 2) from \"sink\" to \"propagation\" since there are 4 entries total and the last one (index 3) should be the sink.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18007c758001KIDYeAy7xIPrdB","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180079156001NxWI32L6lsuWAC"}}
{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1793149355924,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18007c787001sKQ5rBvi0eZT8K","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","messageID":"msg_180079156001NxWI32L6lsuWAC","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":54544,"input":10905,"output":324,"reasoning":115,"cache":{"write":0,"read":43200}},"cost":0}}
{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149358941,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18007d35a001grL25eu73jkd0C","messageID":"msg_18007c7a10015G6AUg6F8TdwoA","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149360631,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-66386962-3bad-4831-b0e8-0eb69ab62952","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Validate findings.json again","command":"node /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/findings.json"},"output":"PASS: 3 findings valid\n","metadata":{"output":"PASS: 3 findings valid\n","exit":0,"description":"Validate findings.json again","truncated":false},"title":"Validate findings.json again","time":{"start":1793149360624,"end":1793149360629}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me re-validate the findings.json.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18007d977001ozpFLuYTPbo0ud","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18007c7a10015G6AUg6F8TdwoA"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149362750,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_18007e23b001ADv9q3qaj9kVpT","messageID":"msg_18007da0c0017GK7svL6k0kXdg","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149366657,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-6f258ca0-e05b-4d52-9148-af6b612f6244","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"node /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","description":"Validate coverage ledger"},"output":"ERROR: $: expected a top-level array\nFAIL: 1 validation error(s)\n","metadata":{"output":"ERROR: $: expected a top-level array\nFAIL: 1 validation error(s)\n","exit":1,"description":"Validate coverage ledger","truncated":false},"title":"Validate coverage ledger","time":{"start":1793149366653,"end":1793149366656}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The findings.json is now valid. Now I need to run the coverage ledger validation as well. Let me check the validate-coverage-ledger.cjs script.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_18007f116001EhTNlqLdD1CQt6","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18007da0c0017GK7svL6k0kXdg"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149374428,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call-c96edc2e-a2ce-4d27-810f-5445d527fd7f","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs"},"output":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs\nfile\n\n1: #!/usr/bin/env node\n2: \n3: /**\n4: * Validates coverage-ledger.json and its canonical coverage IDs.\n5: * Usage: node validate-coverage-ledger.cjs \n6: */\n7: \n8: const fs = require(\"node:fs\");\n9: const path = require(\"node:path\");\n10: const { TextDecoder } = require(\"node:util\");\n11: \n12: // Conservative bounds apply before JSON.parse and again to the parsed document.\n13: const LIMITS = Object.freeze({\n14: inputBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,\n15: units: 10000,\n16: collectionItems: 1000,\n17: objectFields: 1000,\n18: nestingDepth: 64,\n19: preflightValues: 500000,\n20: validationErrors: 100,\n21: });\n22: const MAX_INPUT_BYTES = LIMITS.inputBytes;\n23: const MAX_UNITS = LIMITS.units;\n24: const MAX_LIST_ITEMS = LIMITS.collectionItems;\n25: const MAX_TEXT_LENGTH = 4096;\n26: const REQUIRED_FIELDS = [\n27: \"coverage_id\",\n28: \"canonical_refs\",\n29: \"surface\",\n30: \"boundary\",\n31: \"subsystem\",\n32: \"attack_class\",\n33: \"starting_paths\",\n34: \"ordinary_attack_class_block\",\n35: \"selected_companion_blocks\",\n36: \"excluded_blocks\",\n37: \"prior_status\",\n38: \"attempts\",\n39: \"wave\",\n40: \"status\",\n41: \"agent_id\",\n42: \"reviewed_paths\",\n43: \"local_checks\",\n44: \"result_fingerprints\",\n45: \"unresolved\",\n46: ];\n47: const REF_FIELDS = [\"surface\", \"boundary\", \"subsystem\", \"attack_class\"];\n48: const STATUSES = new Set([\n49: \"planned\",\n50: \"not_applicable\",\n51: \"out_of_scope\",\n52: \"in_progress\",\n53: \"covered\",\n54: \"candidate\",\n55: \"blocked\",\n56: \"deferred\",\n57: ]);\n58: const ATTEMPT_STATUSES = new Set([\"covered\", \"candidate\", \"blocked\"]);\n59: const ATTEMPT_FIELDS = [\n60: \"wave\",\n61: \"status\",\n62: \"agent_id\",\n63: \"reviewed_paths\",\n64: \"local_checks\",\n65: \"result_fingerprints\",\n66: \"unresolved\",\n67: \"reassignment_reason\",\n68: ];\n69: const PRIOR_STATUSES = new Set([\n70: \"new\",\n71: \"prior_confirmed_same_source\",\n72: \"prior_confirmed_changed_source\",\n73: \"prior_needs_validation\",\n74: \"prior_deferred\",\n75: \"prior_blocked\",\n76: \"prior_out_of_scope\",\n77: \"prior_covered_same_source\",\n78: \"prior_covered_changed_source\",\n79: \"prior_rejected_claim_changed\",\n80: \"none\",\n81: ]);\n82: const FINGERPRINT_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$/;\n83: const AGENT_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;\n84: const WINDOWS_RESERVED_AGENT_ID = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|com[1-9]|lpt[1-9])$/;\n85: const VISIBLE_CONTENT = /[^\\p{White_Space}\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;\n86: const PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER = /[\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Zl}\\p{Zp}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;\n87: const WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|clock\\$|conin\\$|conout\\$|com[1-9\\u00b9\\u00b2\\u00b3]|lpt[1-9\\u00b9\\u00b2\\u00b3])(?:\\.|$)/iu;\n88: const UTF8_DECODER = new TextDecoder(\"utf-8\", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true });\n89: const UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER = /[\\p{Cc}\\p{Cf}\\p{Cs}\\p{Zl}\\p{Zp}\\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/gu;\n90: const MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH = 256;\n91: \n92: const hasOwn = (value, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key);\n93: \n94: class JsonStructureError extends Error {}\n95: class SafeInputError extends Error {}\n96: \n97: function escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(value) {\n98: return String(value).replace(UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER, (character) => {\n99: const codePoint = character.codePointAt(0);\n100: return codePoint <= 0xffff\n101: ? `\\\\u${codePoint.toString(16).padStart(4, \"0\")}`\n102: : `\\\\u{${codePoint.toString(16)}}`;\n103: });\n104: }\n105: \n106: function safeQuote(value) {\n107: let serialized;\n108: if (typeof value === \"string\") {\n109: const clipped = value.length > MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH\n110: ? `${value.slice(0, MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH)}...`\n111: : value;\n112: serialized = JSON.stringify(clipped);\n113: } else if (value === null || typeof value === \"boolean\") {\n114: serialized = String(value);\n115: } else if (typeof value === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(value)) {\n116: serialized = String(value);\n117: } else {\n118: serialized = `\"<${Array.isArray(value) ? \"array\" : typeof value}>\"`;\n119: }\n120: return escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(serialized);\n121: }\n122: \n123: function createErrorList() {\n124: const errors = [];\n125: Object.defineProperty(errors, \"push\", {\n126: value(...messages) {\n127: const remaining = LIMITS.validationErrors - this.length;\n128: if (remaining > 0) {\n129: Array.prototype.push.apply(this, messages.slice(0, remaining).map(escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters));\n130: }\n131: return this.length;\n132: },\n133: });\n134: return errors;\n135: }\n136: \n137: function isObject(value) {\n138: return value !== null && typeof value === \"object\" && !Array.isArray(value);\n139: }\n140: \n141: function preflightJsonText(contents) {\n142: const containers = [];\n143: let rootState = \"value\";\n144: let inString = false;\n145: let escaped = false;\n146: let totalValues = 0;\n147: \n148: function fail(message) {\n149: throw new JsonStructureError(`input ${message}`);\n150: }\n151: \n152: function currentContainer() {\n153: return containers[containers.length - 1];\n154: }\n155: \n156: function countValue() {\n157: totalValues++;\n158: if (totalValues > LIMITS.preflightValues) {\n159: fail(`exceeds ${LIMITS.preflightValues} total value limit`);\n160: }\n161: }\n162: \n163: function beginValue() {\n164: const container = currentContainer();\n165: if (!container) {\n166: if (rootState !== \"value\") fail(\"has malformed JSON structure\");\n167: rootState = \"end\";\n168: } else if (container.type === \"array\") {\n169: if (container.state !== \"firstValueOrEnd\" && container.state !== \"value\") {\n170: fail(\"has malformed JSON array structure\");\n171: }\n172: container.items++;\n173: const limit = container.topLevel ? MAX_UNITS : LIMITS.collectionItems;\n174: if (container.items > limit) {\n175: fail(container.topLevel\n176: ? `exceeds ${limit} top-level unit limit`\n177: : `exceeds ${limit} item array limit`);\n178: }\n179: container.state = \"commaOrEnd\";\n180: } else {\n181: if (container.state !== \"value\") fail(\"has malformed JSON object structure\");\n182: container.state = \"commaOrEnd\";\n183: }\n184: countValue();\n185: }\n186: \n187: function beginString() {\n188: const container = currentContainer();\n189: if (container && container.type === \"object\" &&\n190: (container.state === \"firstKeyOrEnd\" || container.state === \"key\")) {\n191: container.fields++;\n192: if (container.fields > LIMITS.objectFields) {\n193: fail(`exceeds ${LIMITS.objectFields} field object limit`);\n194: }\n195: container.state = \"colon\";\n196: } else {\n197: beginValue();\n198: }\n199: inString = true;\n200: }\n201: \n202: function beginContainer(type) {\n203: beginValue();\n204: if (containers.length >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {\n205: fail(`exceeds nesting depth limit ${LIMITS.nestingDepth}`);\n206: }\n207: containers.push(type === \"array\"\n208: ? { type, state: \"firstValueOrEnd\", items: 0, topLevel: containers.length === 0 }\n209: : { type, state: \"firstKeyOrEnd\", fields: 0 });\n210: }\n211: \n212: function closeContainer(type) {\n213: const container = currentContainer();\n214: if (!container || container.type !== type) fail(\"has mismatched JSON containers\");\n215: const canClose = type === \"array\"\n216: ? container.state === \"firstValueOrEnd\" || container.state === \"commaOrEnd\"\n217: : container.state === \"firstKeyOrEnd\" || container.state === \"commaOrEnd\";\n218: if (!canClose) fail(`has malformed JSON ${type} structure`);\n219: containers.pop();\n220: }\n221: \n222: function isWhitespace(character) {\n223: return character === \" \" || character === \"\\t\" || character === \"\\r\" || character === \"\\n\";\n224: }\n225: \n226: function isTokenDelimiter(character) {\n227: return isWhitespace(character) || character === \",\" || character === \":\" ||\n228: character === \"[\" || character === \"]\" || character === \"{\" ||\n229: character === \"}\" || character === \"\\\"\";\n230: }\n231: \n232: for (let index = 0; index < contents.length; index++) {\n233: const character = contents[index];\n234: if (inString) {\n235: if (escaped) {\n236: escaped = false;\n237: } else if (character === \"\\\\\") {\n238: escaped = true;\n239: } else if (character === \"\\\"\") {\n240: inString = false;\n241: }\n242: continue;\n243: }\n244: if (isWhitespace(character)) continue;\n245: \n246: if (character === \"\\\"\") {\n247: beginString();\n248: } else if (character === \"[\") {\n249: beginContainer(\"array\");\n250: } else if (character === \"{\") {\n251: beginContainer(\"object\");\n252: } else if (character === \"]\") {\n253: closeContainer(\"array\");\n254: } else if (character === \"}\") {\n255: closeContainer(\"object\");\n256: } else if (character === \":\") {\n257: const container = currentContainer();\n258: if (!container || container.type !== \"object\" || container.state !== \"colon\") {\n259: fail(\"has malformed JSON object structure\");\n260: }\n261: container.state = \"value\";\n262: } else if (character === \",\") {\n263: const container = currentContainer();\n264: if (!container || container.state !== \"commaOrEnd\") fail(\"has malformed JSON collection structure\");\n265: container.state = container.type === \"array\" ? \"value\" : \"key\";\n266: } else {\n267: beginValue();\n268: while (index + 1 < contents.length && !isTokenDelimiter(contents[index + 1])) index++;\n269: }\n270: }\n271: \n272: if (inString) fail(\"has an unterminated JSON string\");\n273: if (containers.length > 0) fail(\"has truncated JSON structure\");\n274: if (rootState !== \"end\") fail(\"has no JSON value\");\n275: }\n276: \n277: function preflightDocument(root) {\n278: const errors = createErrorList();\n279: const stack = [{ value: root, depth: 0, location: \"$\" }];\n280: let visited = 0;\n281: \n282: while (stack.length > 0) {\n283: const { value, depth, location } = stack.pop();\n284: visited++;\n285: if (visited > LIMITS.preflightValues) {\n286: errors.push(`$: exceeds ${LIMITS.preflightValues} total values`);\n287: return errors;\n288: }\n289: if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") continue;\n290: if (depth >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {\n291: errors.push(`${location}: exceeds nesting depth limit ${LIMITS.nestingDepth}`);\n292: return errors;\n293: }\n294: \n295: if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n296: const limit = location === \"$\" ? MAX_UNITS : MAX_LIST_ITEMS;\n297: if (value.length > limit) {\n298: errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${limit} entries`);\n299: return errors;\n300: }\n301: for (let index = value.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {\n302: stack.push({ value: value[index], depth: depth + 1, location: `${location}[${index}]` });\n303: }\n304: continue;\n305: }\n306: \n307: const keys = Object.keys(value);\n308: if (keys.length > LIMITS.objectFields) {\n309: errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.objectFields} object fields`);\n310: return errors;\n311: }\n312: for (let index = keys.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {\n313: const key = keys[index];\n314: stack.push({ value: value[key], depth: depth + 1, location: `${location}{${index}}` });\n315: }\n316: }\n317: \n318: return errors;\n319: }\n320: \n321: function hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) {\n322: let index = 0;\n323: while (index < value.length) {\n324: const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);\n325: if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff) {\n326: if (index >= value.length) return false;\n327: const second = value.charCodeAt(index++);\n328: if (second < 0xdc00 || second > 0xdfff) return false;\n329: } else if (first >= 0xdc00 && first <= 0xdfff) {\n330: return false;\n331: }\n332: }\n333: return true;\n334: }\n335: \n336: function hasVisibleProse(value) {\n337: return hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) && VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value);\n338: }\n339: \n340: function isVisibleText(value, maxLength = MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {\n341: return typeof value === \"string\" &&\n342: value.length > 0 &&\n343: value.length <= maxLength &&\n344: value.trim() === value &&\n345: hasVisibleProse(value);\n346: }\n347: \n348: function isCanonicalRef(value) {\n349: return isVisibleText(value, 1024) &&\n350: !PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) &&\n351: value.normalize(\"NFC\") === value;\n352: }\n353: \n354: function encodeCanonicalRef(value) {\n355: if (!isCanonicalRef(value)) throw new TypeError(\"invalid canonical reference\");\n356: let encoded = \"\";\n357: for (const byte of Buffer.from(value, \"utf8\")) {\n358: const unreserved =\n359: (byte >= 0x41 && byte <= 0x5a) ||\n360: (byte >= 0x61 && byte <= 0x7a) ||\n361: (byte >= 0x30 && byte <= 0x39) ||\n362: byte === 0x2d || byte === 0x2e || byte === 0x5f || byte === 0x7e;\n363: encoded += unreserved ? String.fromCharCode(byte) : `%${byte.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, \"0\")}`;\n364: }\n365: return encoded;\n366: }\n367: \n368: function canonicalCoverageId(refs) {\n369: if (!isObject(refs)) throw new TypeError(\"canonical_refs must be an object\");\n370: const fields = hasOwn(refs, \"lifecycle\") ? [...REF_FIELDS, \"lifecycle\"] : REF_FIELDS;\n371: if (Object.keys(refs).length !== fields.length || fields.some((field) => !hasOwn(refs, field))) {\n372: throw new TypeError(\"canonical_refs has missing or unexpected fields\");\n373: }\n374: return fields.map((field) => encodeCanonicalRef(refs[field])).join(\"::\");\n375: }\n376: \n377: function isSafeRelativePath(value) {\n378: if (typeof value !== \"string\" || value.length === 0 || !hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) || value.trim() !== value || PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) || value.includes(\"\\\\\") || value.includes(\":\")) return false;\n379: if (path.posix.isAbsolute(value) || path.win32.isAbsolute(value) || /^[A-Za-z]:/.test(value) || value.startsWith(\"~\")) return false;\n380: return value.split(\"/\").every((segment) =>\n381: segment !== \"\" &&\n382: segment !== \".\" &&\n383: segment !== \"..\" &&\n384: !/[ .]$/u.test(segment) &&\n385: !WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT.test(segment));\n386: }\n387: \n388: function isSafeAgentId(value) {\n389: return typeof value === \"string\" &&\n390: AGENT_ID_PATTERN.test(value) &&\n391: !WINDOWS_RESERVED_AGENT_ID.test(value);\n392: }\n393: \n394: function isOwnedArtifactPath(value, agentId) {\n395: if (!isSafeAgentId(agentId) || !isSafeRelativePath(value)) return false;\n396: const prefix = `agents/${agentId}/artifacts/`;\n397: return value.startsWith(prefix) && value.length > prefix.length;\n398: }\n399: \n400: function validateStringArray(value, location, errors, options = {}) {\n401: const { allowEmpty = true, fingerprint = false, pathValue = false } = options;\n402: if (!Array.isArray(value)) {\n403: errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);\n404: return;\n405: }\n406: if (!allowEmpty && value.length === 0) errors.push(`${location}: must not be empty`);\n407: if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);\n408: const seen = new Set();\n409: value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((entry, index) => {\n410: const entryLocation = `${location}[${index}]`;\n411: const valid = pathValue ? isSafeRelativePath(entry) : isVisibleText(entry);\n412: if (!valid) errors.push(`${entryLocation}: invalid ${pathValue ? \"repository-relative path\" : \"text\"}`);\n413: if (fingerprint && typeof entry === \"string\" && !FINGERPRINT_PATTERN.test(entry)) {\n414: errors.push(`${entryLocation}: invalid fingerprint`);\n415: }\n416: if (typeof entry === \"string\" && seen.has(entry)) errors.push(`${entryLocation}: duplicate entry`);\n417: if (typeof entry === \"string\") seen.add(entry);\n418: });\n419: }\n420: \n421: function validateChecks(value, location, errors) {\n422: if (!Array.isArray(value)) {\n423: errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);\n424: return;\n425: }\n426: if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);\n427: value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((check, index) => {\n428: const base = `${location}[${index}]`;\n429: if (!isObject(check)) {\n430: errors.push(`${base}: expected object`);\n431: return;\n432: }\n433: for (const field of [\"agent_id\", \"reviewed_paths\", \"invariant\", \"method\", \"result\", \"artifact\"]) {\n434: if (!hasOwn(check, field)) errors.push(`${base}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);\n435: }\n436: if (!isSafeAgentId(check.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: expected a canonical lowercase agent ID`);\n437: validateStringArray(check.reviewed_paths, `${base}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { allowEmpty: false, pathValue: true });\n438: if (!isVisibleText(check.invariant)) errors.push(`${base}.invariant: invalid text`);\n439: if (check.method !== \"source\" && check.method !== \"local\") errors.push(`${base}.method: expected \"source\" or \"local\"`);\n440: if (!isVisibleText(check.result)) errors.push(`${base}.result: invalid text`);\n441: if (check.method === \"source\" && check.artifact !== null) {\n442: errors.push(`${base}.artifact: source-only check must use null`);\n443: } else if (check.method === \"local\") {\n444: if (!isOwnedArtifactPath(check.artifact, check.agent_id)) {\n445: errors.push(`${base}.artifact: local check requires an artifact owned by agent ${safeQuote(isSafeAgentId(check.agent_id) ? check.agent_id : \"\")}`);\n446: }\n447: } else if (check.method !== \"source\" && check.method !== \"local\" && check.artifact !== null && !isSafeRelativePath(check.artifact)) {\n448: errors.push(`${base}.artifact: expected null or a safe output-relative path`);\n449: }\n450: });\n451: }\n452: \n453: function validateReviewedPathOwnership(unit, base, errors) {\n454: if (!Array.isArray(unit.reviewed_paths) || !Array.isArray(unit.local_checks)) return;\n455: const aggregatePaths = new Set(unit.reviewed_paths.filter((value) => typeof value === \"string\"));\n456: const ownedPaths = new Set();\n457: for (const check of unit.local_checks) {\n458: if (!isObject(check) || !Array.isArray(check.reviewed_paths)) continue;\n459: for (const reviewedPath of check.reviewed_paths) {\n460: if (typeof reviewedPath === \"string\") ownedPaths.add(reviewedPath);\n461: }\n462: }\n463: for (const reviewedPath of aggregatePaths) {\n464: if (!ownedPaths.has(reviewedPath)) errors.push(`${base}.reviewed_paths: ${safeQuote(reviewedPath)} has no check owner`);\n465: }\n466: for (const reviewedPath of ownedPaths) {\n467: if (!aggregatePaths.has(reviewedPath)) errors.push(`${base}.local_checks: owned path ${safeQuote(reviewedPath)} is absent from aggregate reviewed_paths`);\n468: }\n469: }\n470: \n471: function validateExcludedBlocks(value, location, errors) {\n472: if (!Array.isArray(value)) {\n473: errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);\n474: return;\n475: }\n476: if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);\n477: const seen = new Set();\n478: value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((entry, index) => {\n479: const base = `${location}[${index}]`;\n480: if (!isObject(entry)) {\n481: errors.push(`${base}: expected object`);\n482: return;\n483: }\n484: if (!isVisibleText(entry.block)) errors.push(`${base}.block: invalid text`);\n485: if (!isVisibleText(entry.reason)) errors.push(`${base}.reason: invalid text`);\n486: if (typeof entry.block === \"string\" && seen.has(entry.block)) errors.push(`${base}.block: duplicate entry`);\n487: if (typeof entry.block === \"string\") seen.add(entry.block);\n488: });\n489: }\n490: \n491: function semanticKey(unit) {\n492: return JSON.stringify([\n493: unit.surface,\n494: unit.boundary,\n495: unit.subsystem,\n496: unit.attack_class,\n497: hasOwn(unit, \"lifecycle\") ? unit.lifecycle : null,\n498: ]);\n499: }\n500: \n501: function hasValidSemanticFields(unit) {\n502: return [\"surface\", \"boundary\", \"subsystem\", \"attack_class\"].every((field) => isVisibleText(unit[field])) &&\n503: (!hasOwn(unit, \"lifecycle\") || isVisibleText(unit.lifecycle));\n504: }\n505: \n506: function requireEmptyArray(unit, field, base, errors) {\n507: if (Array.isArray(unit[field]) && unit[field].length > 0) {\n508: errors.push(`${base}.${field}: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} must keep this array empty`);\n509: }\n510: }\n511: \n512: function requireNonemptyArray(unit, field, base, errors) {\n513: if (!Array.isArray(unit[field]) || unit[field].length === 0) {\n514: errors.push(`${base}.${field}: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} requires entries`);\n515: }\n516: }\n517: \n518: function validateStateInvariants(unit, base, errors) {\n519: const emptyEvidence = () => {\n520: requireEmptyArray(unit, \"reviewed_paths\", base, errors);\n521: requireEmptyArray(unit, \"local_checks\", base, errors);\n522: };\n523: const requireOwner = () => {\n524: if (!isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} requires a canonical lowercase agent ID`);\n525: };\n526: \n527: if (unit.status !== \"candidate\") requireEmptyArray(unit, \"result_fingerprints\", base, errors);\n528: \n529: switch (unit.status) {\n530: case \"planned\":\n531: if (unit.agent_id !== null) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: planned unit must be unassigned`);\n532: emptyEvidence();\n533: requireEmptyArray(unit, \"unresolved\", base, errors);\n534: break;\n535: case \"not_applicable\":\n536: case \"out_of_scope\":\n537: case \"deferred\":\n538: if (unit.agent_id !== null) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} must be unassigned`);\n539: emptyEvidence();\n540: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"unresolved\", base, errors);\n541: break;\n542: case \"in_progress\":\n543: requireOwner();\n544: emptyEvidence();\n545: requireEmptyArray(unit, \"unresolved\", base, errors);\n546: break;\n547: case \"blocked\":\n548: requireOwner();\n549: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"reviewed_paths\", base, errors);\n550: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"local_checks\", base, errors);\n551: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"unresolved\", base, errors);\n552: break;\n553: case \"covered\":\n554: requireOwner();\n555: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"reviewed_paths\", base, errors);\n556: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"local_checks\", base, errors);\n557: requireEmptyArray(unit, \"unresolved\", base, errors);\n558: break;\n559: case \"candidate\":\n560: requireOwner();\n561: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"reviewed_paths\", base, errors);\n562: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"local_checks\", base, errors);\n563: requireNonemptyArray(unit, \"result_fingerprints\", base, errors);\n564: break;\n565: }\n566: }\n567: \n568: function validateAttempts(value, unit, base, errors) {\n569: if (!Array.isArray(value)) {\n570: errors.push(`${base}.attempts: expected array`);\n571: return;\n572: }\n573: if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${base}.attempts: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);\n574: \n575: const priorOwners = new Set();\n576: const priorArtifacts = new Set();\n577: let previousWave = 0;\n578: value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((attempt, index) => {\n579: const attemptBase = `${base}.attempts[${index}]`;\n580: if (!isObject(attempt)) {\n581: errors.push(`${attemptBase}: expected object`);\n582: return;\n583: }\n584: for (const field of ATTEMPT_FIELDS) {\n585: if (!hasOwn(attempt, field)) errors.push(`${attemptBase}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);\n586: }\n587: if (!Number.isInteger(attempt.wave) || attempt.wave < 1) {\n588: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: expected a positive integer`);\n589: } else {\n590: if (attempt.wave <= previousWave) errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: archived attempt waves must be strictly increasing`);\n591: if (Number.isInteger(unit.wave) && attempt.wave >= unit.wave) {\n592: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave ${safeQuote(unit.wave)}`);\n593: }\n594: previousWave = attempt.wave;\n595: }\n596: if (!ATTEMPT_STATUSES.has(attempt.status)) {\n597: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.status: expected \"covered\", \"candidate\", or \"blocked\"`);\n598: }\n599: let hasFreshOwner = false;\n600: if (!isSafeAgentId(attempt.agent_id)) {\n601: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.agent_id: archived attempt requires a canonical lowercase agent ID`);\n602: } else if (priorOwners.has(attempt.agent_id)) {\n603: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.agent_id: assignment owner must be fresh for each attempt`);\n604: } else {\n605: hasFreshOwner = true;\n606: }\n607: validateStringArray(attempt.reviewed_paths, `${attemptBase}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { pathValue: true });\n608: validateChecks(attempt.local_checks, `${attemptBase}.local_checks`, errors);\n609: validateReviewedPathOwnership(attempt, attemptBase, errors);\n610: validateStringArray(attempt.result_fingerprints, `${attemptBase}.result_fingerprints`, errors, { fingerprint: true });\n611: validateStringArray(attempt.unresolved, `${attemptBase}.unresolved`, errors);\n612: if (!isVisibleText(attempt.reassignment_reason)) errors.push(`${attemptBase}.reassignment_reason: invalid text`);\n613: validateStateInvariants(attempt, attemptBase, errors);\n614: \n615: if (Array.isArray(attempt.local_checks)) {\n616: attempt.local_checks.forEach((check, checkIndex) => {\n617: if (!isObject(check)) return;\n618: if (priorOwners.has(check.agent_id)) {\n619: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.local_checks[${checkIndex}].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its earlier attempt`);\n620: }\n621: if (typeof check.artifact === \"string\" && priorArtifacts.has(check.artifact)) {\n622: errors.push(`${attemptBase}.local_checks[${checkIndex}].artifact: artifact from an earlier attempt cannot be reused`);\n623: }\n624: if (check.method === \"local\" && typeof check.artifact === \"string\") priorArtifacts.add(check.artifact);\n625: });\n626: }\n627: if (hasFreshOwner) priorOwners.add(attempt.agent_id);\n628: });\n629: \n630: if (isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id) && priorOwners.has(unit.agent_id)) {\n631: errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment`);\n632: }\n633: if (Array.isArray(unit.local_checks)) {\n634: unit.local_checks.forEach((check, index) => {\n635: if (!isObject(check)) return;\n636: if (priorOwners.has(check.agent_id)) {\n637: errors.push(`${base}.local_checks[${index}].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt`);\n638: }\n639: if (typeof check.artifact === \"string\" && priorArtifacts.has(check.artifact)) {\n640: errors.push(`${base}.local_checks[${index}].artifact: artifact from an archived attempt cannot be reused`);\n641: }\n642: });\n643: }\n644: }\n645: \n646: function collectUnitErrors(unit, index) {\n647: const errors = createErrorList();\n648: const base = `$[${index}]`;\n649: if (!isObject(unit)) return [`${base}: expected object`];\n650: \n651: for (const field of REQUIRED_FIELDS) {\n652: if (!hasOwn(unit, field)) errors.push(`${base}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);\n653: }\n654: for (const field of [\"surface\", \"boundary\", \"subsystem\", \"attack_class\"]) {\n655: if (!isVisibleText(unit[field])) errors.push(`${base}.${field}: invalid text`);\n656: }\n657: if (hasOwn(unit, \"lifecycle\") && !isVisibleText(unit.lifecycle)) errors.push(`${base}.lifecycle: invalid text`);\n658: \n659: let expectedId = null;\n660: if (!isObject(unit.canonical_refs)) {\n661: errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: expected object`);\n662: } else {\n663: const expectedFields = hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, \"lifecycle\") ? [...REF_FIELDS, \"lifecycle\"] : REF_FIELDS;\n664: for (const field of expectedFields) {\n665: if (!hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, field)) {\n666: errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);\n667: } else if (!isCanonicalRef(unit.canonical_refs[field])) {\n668: errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs.${field}: invalid canonical reference`);\n669: }\n670: }\n671: if (Object.keys(unit.canonical_refs).some((field) => !expectedFields.includes(field))) {\n672: errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: contains unexpected fields`);\n673: }\n674: if (hasOwn(unit, \"lifecycle\") !== hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, \"lifecycle\")) {\n675: errors.push(`${base}: lifecycle and canonical_refs.lifecycle must appear together`);\n676: }\n677: try {\n678: expectedId = canonicalCoverageId(unit.canonical_refs);\n679: } catch {\n680: // The specific reference errors above are more useful.\n681: }\n682: }\n683: if (!isVisibleText(unit.coverage_id, 65536)) {\n684: errors.push(`${base}.coverage_id: invalid text`);\n685: } else if (expectedId !== null && unit.coverage_id !== expectedId) {\n686: errors.push(`${base}.coverage_id: expected canonical ID ${safeQuote(expectedId)}`);\n687: }\n688: \n689: validateStringArray(unit.starting_paths, `${base}.starting_paths`, errors, { allowEmpty: false, pathValue: true });\n690: if (unit.ordinary_attack_class_block !== null && !isVisibleText(unit.ordinary_attack_class_block)) {\n691: errors.push(`${base}.ordinary_attack_class_block: expected null or non-empty text`);\n692: }\n693: validateStringArray(unit.selected_companion_blocks, `${base}.selected_companion_blocks`, errors);\n694: validateExcludedBlocks(unit.excluded_blocks, `${base}.excluded_blocks`, errors);\n695: if (Array.isArray(unit.selected_companion_blocks) && Array.isArray(unit.excluded_blocks)) {\n696: const selected = new Set(unit.selected_companion_blocks);\n697: unit.excluded_blocks.forEach((entry, blockIndex) => {\n698: if (isObject(entry) && selected.has(entry.block)) {\n699: errors.push(`${base}.excluded_blocks[${blockIndex}].block: block is also selected`);\n700: }\n701: });\n702: }\n703: \n704: if (!PRIOR_STATUSES.has(unit.prior_status)) errors.push(`${base}.prior_status: invalid value ${safeQuote(unit.prior_status)}`);\n705: if (!STATUSES.has(unit.status)) errors.push(`${base}.status: invalid value ${safeQuote(unit.status)}`);\n706: if (!Number.isInteger(unit.wave) || unit.wave < 1) errors.push(`${base}.wave: expected a positive integer`);\n707: if (unit.agent_id !== null && !isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: expected null or a safe agent ID`);\n708: \n709: validateAttempts(unit.attempts, unit, base, errors);\n710: validateStringArray(unit.reviewed_paths, `${base}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { pathValue: true });\n711: validateChecks(unit.local_checks, `${base}.local_checks`, errors);\n712: validateReviewedPathOwnership(unit, base, errors);\n713: validateStringArray(unit.result_fingerprints, `${base}.result_fingerprints`, errors, { fingerprint: true });\n714: validateStringArray(unit.unresolved, `${base}.unresolved`, errors);\n715: \n716: validateStateInvariants(unit, base, errors);\n717: \n718: return errors;\n719: }\n720: \n721: function readFileWithinLimit(file) {\n722: const noFollow = fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW;\n723: const nonBlock = fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK;\n724: if (!Number.isInteger(noFollow) || noFollow === 0 || !Number.isInteger(nonBlock) || nonBlock === 0) {\n725: // Node exposes no race-safe fallback on these platforms, so reject all inputs.\n726: throw new SafeInputError(\"OS no-follow and nonblocking input protection is unavailable\");\n727: }\n728: \n729: let descriptor;\n730: try {\n731: descriptor = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | noFollow | nonBlock);\n732: } catch (error) {\n733: if (error && (error.code === \"ELOOP\" || error.code === \"EMLINK\")) throw new SafeInputError(\"input must not be a symlink\");\n734: throw error;\n735: }\n736: try {\n737: const stat = fs.fstatSync(descriptor);\n738: if (!stat.isFile()) throw new SafeInputError(\"input must be a regular file\");\n739: if (stat.size > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${MAX_INPUT_BYTES} byte limit`);\n740: \n741: const chunks = [];\n742: const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);\n743: let bytesRead = 0;\n744: while (true) {\n745: const count = fs.readSync(descriptor, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);\n746: if (count === 0) break;\n747: bytesRead += count;\n748: if (bytesRead > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${MAX_INPUT_BYTES} byte limit`);\n749: chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));\n750: }\n751: try {\n752: return UTF8_DECODER.decode(Buffer.concat(chunks, bytesRead));\n753: } catch {\n754: throw new SafeInputError(\"input is not valid UTF-8\");\n755: }\n756: } finally {\n757: fs.closeSync(descriptor);\n758: }\n759: }\n760: \n761: function validateDocument(ledger) {\n762: const errors = createErrorList();\n763: if (!Array.isArray(ledger)) {\n764: errors.push(\"$: expected a top-level array\");\n765: return errors;\n766: }\n767: if (ledger.length > MAX_UNITS) {\n768: errors.push(`$: exceeds ${MAX_UNITS} coverage units`);\n769: return errors;\n770: }\n771: \n772: errors.push(...preflightDocument(ledger));\n773: if (errors.length > 0) return errors;\n774: \n775: const ids = new Map();\n776: const semantics = new Map();\n777: let previousId = null;\n778: for (let index = 0; index < ledger.length && errors.length < LIMITS.validationErrors; index++) {\n779: const unit = ledger[index];\n780: errors.push(...collectUnitErrors(unit, index));\n781: if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) break;\n782: if (!isObject(unit) || typeof unit.coverage_id !== \"string\") continue;\n783: \n784: const key = hasValidSemanticFields(unit) ? semanticKey(unit) : null;\n785: if (ids.has(unit.coverage_id)) {\n786: const previous = ids.get(unit.coverage_id);\n787: const qualifier = key !== null && previous.key !== null && previous.key !== key\n788: ? \"canonical identity collision with different semantic fields\"\n789: : \"duplicate coverage ID\";\n790: errors.push(`$[${index}].coverage_id: ${qualifier} at $[${previous.index}]`);\n791: } else {\n792: ids.set(unit.coverage_id, { index, key });\n793: }\n794: if (key !== null && semantics.has(key) && semantics.get(key).id !== unit.coverage_id) {\n795: const previous = semantics.get(key);\n796: errors.push(`$[${index}].canonical_refs: semantic tuple already uses coverage ID ${safeQuote(previous.id)} at $[${previous.index}]`);\n797: } else if (key !== null) {\n798: semantics.set(key, { id: unit.coverage_id, index });\n799: }\n800: if (previousId !== null && previousId > unit.coverage_id) {\n801: errors.push(`$[${index}].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically`);\n802: }\n803: previousId = unit.coverage_id;\n804: }\n805: return errors;\n806: }\n807: \n808: function run(file) {\n809: if (!file) {\n810: console.error(\"Usage: node validate-coverage-ledger.cjs \");\n811: return 1;\n812: }\n813: \n814: let contents;\n815: try {\n816: contents = readFileWithinLimit(file);\n817: } catch (error) {\n818: const reason = error instanceof SafeInputError ? error.message : \"input could not be opened or read safely\";\n819: console.error(`Failed to read coverage ledger: ${reason}`);\n820: return 1;\n821: }\n822: \n823: let ledger;\n824: try {\n825: preflightJsonText(contents);\n826: } catch (error) {\n827: const reason = error instanceof JsonStructureError ? error.message : \"invalid JSON structure\";\n828: console.error(`Failed to parse coverage ledger: ${reason}`);\n829: return 1;\n830: }\n831: try {\n832: ledger = JSON.parse(contents);\n833: } catch {\n834: console.error(\"Failed to parse coverage ledger: invalid JSON syntax\");\n835: return 1;\n836: }\n837: \n838: let errors;\n839: try {\n840: errors = validateDocument(ledger);\n841: } catch {\n842: console.error(\"Failed to validate coverage ledger: unexpected validation error\");\n843: return 1;\n844: }\n845: for (const message of errors) console.error(\"ERROR:\", message);\n846: if (errors.length > 0) {\n847: const cap = errors.length === LIMITS.validationErrors ? `; output capped at ${LIMITS.validationErrors}` : \"\";\n848: console.error(`FAIL: ${errors.length} validation error(s)${cap}`);\n849: return 1;\n850: }\n851: console.log(`PASS: ${ledger.length} coverage units valid`);\n852: return 0;\n853: }\n854: \n855: module.exports = {\n856: LIMITS,\n857: PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER,\n858: UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER,\n859: VISIBLE_CONTENT,\n860: WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT,\n861: canonicalCoverageId,\n862: encodeCanonicalRef,\n863: hasVisibleProse,\n864: isSafeAgentId,\n865: isSafeRelativePath,\n866: preflightJsonText,\n867: readFileWithinLimit,\n868: safeQuote,\n869: validateDocument,\n870: };\n871: \n872: if (require.main === module) process.exit(run(process.argv[2]));\n\n(End of file - total 872 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#!/usr/bin/env node\n\n/**\n * Validates coverage-ledger.json and its canonical coverage IDs.\n * Usage: node validate-coverage-ledger.cjs \n */\n\nconst fs = require(\"node:fs\");\nconst path = require(\"node:path\");\nconst { TextDecoder } = require(\"node:util\");\n\n// Conservative bounds apply before JSON.parse and again to the parsed document.\nconst LIMITS = Object.freeze({\n inputBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,\n units: 10000,\n collectionItems: 1000,\n objectFields: 1000,\n nestingDepth: 64,\n preflightValues: 500000,\n validationErrors: 100,","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs","time":{"start":1793149374418,"end":1793149374426}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The coverage ledger validation expects a top-level array. Let me check the validate-coverage-ledger.cjs script to understand the expected format.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180080fcd0011uglRtBYxaoKCI","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_18007f198001MQydUBrn9eCbfi"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149467476,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-c96a1367-a4f6-4481-9fdb-daa96300849c","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"content":"[\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET::/search::user->database::injection-sql\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /search\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /search\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"search_notes() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: search_notes() uses string interpolation at line 22\",\n \"artifact\": null\n },\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"search_notes() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed string interpolation at line 22 allows SQL injection\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"search_notes() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed string interpolation at line 22 allows SQL injection\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET::/attachment::user->filesystem::path-traversal\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /attachment\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /attachment\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_attachment() validates path stays within FILES_DIR\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: read_attachment() lacks path containment check at lines 38-41\",\n \"artifact\": null\n },\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-2\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_attachment() validates path stays within FILES_DIR\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing path validation allows arbitrary file read\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-2\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-2\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_attachment() validates path stays within FILES_DIR\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing path validation allows arbitrary file read\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"POST::/delete::user-A->user-B-data::idor\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"POST /delete\",\n \"boundary\": \"user-A->user-B-data\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"idor\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"POST /delete\",\n \"boundary\": \"user-A->user-B-data\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"idor\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"delete_note() verifies note ownership before deletion\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: delete_note() lacks owner parameter and WHERE clause check\",\n \"artifact\": null\n },\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-3\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"delete_note() verifies note ownership before deletion\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing ownership check allows cross-user note deletion\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"idor-delete-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-3\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-3\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"delete_note() verifies note ownership before deletion\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing ownership check allows cross-user note deletion\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"idor-delete-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET::/note::user->database::injection-sql\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /note\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /note\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"get_note() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: get_note() uses parameterized query at line 28 with both id and owner\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"get_note() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: get_note() uses parameterized query at line 28 with both id and owner\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET::/avatar::user->filesystem::path-traversal\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /avatar\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /avatar\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_avatar() validates path stays within FILES_DIR/avatars\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: read_avatar() uses os.path.abspath() and startswith check at lines 45-47\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_avatar() validates path stays within FILES_DIR/avatars\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: read_avatar() uses os.path.abspath() and startswith check at lines 45-47\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"all::auth::unauthenticated->authenticated::auth-bypass\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"all endpoints\",\n \"boundary\": \"unauthenticated->authenticated\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"auth-bypass\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"all endpoints\",\n \"boundary\": \"unauthenticated->authenticated\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"auth-bypass\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [\n {\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"All endpoints require valid X-Session header\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: current_user() check at lines 63-64, 78-80 returns 401 for missing/invalid session\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": [],\n \"reassignment_reason\": \"\"\n }\n ],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"All endpoints require valid X-Session header\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: current_user() check at lines 63-64, 78-80 returns 401 for missing/invalid session\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n }\n]","filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","exists":true,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","time":{"start":1793149467444,"end":1793149467473}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The coverage ledger expects a different format - it expects a top-level array of coverage units with many required fields. The format I created doesn't match. Let me create a proper coverage ledger that matches the expected schema.\n\nLooking at the required fields:\n- coverage_id (canonical ID derived from canonical_refs)\n- canonical_refs (with surface, boundary, subsystem, attack_class, optionally lifecycle)\n- surface\n- boundary\n- subsystem\n- attack_class\n- starting_paths\n- ordinary_attack_class_block\n- selected_companion_blocks\n- excluded_blocks\n- prior_status\n- attempts\n- wave\n- status\n- agent_id\n- reviewed_paths\n- local_checks\n- result_fingerprints\n- unresolved\n\nThis is a much more detailed format than what I created. Let me rewrite the coverage ledger to match this schema.\n\nFor a quick profile, I need to create a proper coverage ledger. The coverage_id is derived from canonical_refs. Let me create a single coverage unit that covers the whole target with the appropriate canonical references.\n\nActually, looking at the validate-coverage-ledger.cjs, the `canonicalCoverageId` function encodes the canonical_refs fields (surface, boundary, subsystem, attack_class, and optionally lifecycle) into a coverage_id. The coverage_id must match this canonical ID.\n\nLet me create a proper coverage ledger entry.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180097b2c001pgqN6K1R3D411k","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180081015001FcydpNSzPscbhA"}}
{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1793149467490,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180097b53001sBYitCmP2m6ube","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","messageID":"msg_180081015001FcydpNSzPscbhA","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":71091,"input":19972,"output":3262,"reasoning":337,"cache":{"write":0,"read":47520}},"cost":0}}
{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149470103,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_180098594001HCdMeMy1b7bHPj","messageID":"msg_180097b6d001X4q3J2gQ6nLssn","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149471405,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-fea39bea-8d69-406a-8673-3eb5d5fb5df6","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"node /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","description":"Validate coverage ledger"},"output":"ERROR: $[0].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fsearch::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\nERROR: $[0].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[0].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[1].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fattachment::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\nERROR: $[1].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[1].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[1].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[2].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"POST%20%2Fdelete::user-A-%3Euser-B-data::notes-api::idor\"\nERROR: $[2].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[2].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[3].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fnote::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\nERROR: $[3].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[3].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[3].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[3].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nERROR: $[3].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[4].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Favatar::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\nERROR: $[4].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[4].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[4].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[4].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nERROR: $[4].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[5].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"all%20endpoints::unauthenticated-%3Eauthenticated::notes-api::auth-bypass\"\nERROR: $[5].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[5].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[5].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[5].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nFAIL: 27 validation error(s)\n","metadata":{"output":"ERROR: $[0].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fsearch::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\nERROR: $[0].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[0].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[1].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fattachment::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\nERROR: $[1].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[1].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[1].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[2].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"POST%20%2Fdelete::user-A-%3Euser-B-data::notes-api::idor\"\nERROR: $[2].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[2].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[3].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Fnote::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\nERROR: $[3].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[3].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[3].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[3].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nERROR: $[3].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[4].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"GET%20%2Favatar::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\nERROR: $[4].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[4].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[4].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[4].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nERROR: $[4].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically\nERROR: $[5].coverage_id: expected canonical ID \"all%20endpoints::unauthenticated-%3Eauthenticated::notes-api::auth-bypass\"\nERROR: $[5].attempts[0].wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave 1\nERROR: $[5].attempts[0].reassignment_reason: invalid text\nERROR: $[5].agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment\nERROR: $[5].local_checks[0].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt\nFAIL: 27 validation error(s)\n","exit":1,"description":"Validate coverage ledger","truncated":false},"title":"Validate coverage ledger","time":{"start":1793149471398,"end":1793149471403}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me validate the coverage ledger.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_180098a32001JrxoJ2lyrpQ4N8","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180097b6d001X4q3J2gQ6nLssn"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149473001,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_1800990e6001hD5luAitK8izzv","messageID":"msg_180098ac50016MlcG9DEc7eBbg","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149507481,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call-e7516778-c454-4bb7-8327-ff66196864f7","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","content":"[\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET%20%2Fattachment::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /attachment\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /attachment\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-2\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-2\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_attachment() validates path stays within FILES_DIR\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing path validation allows arbitrary file read\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"path-traversal-attachment-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET%20%2Favatar::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /avatar\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /avatar\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->filesystem\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"path-traversal\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"read_avatar() validates path stays within FILES_DIR/avatars\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: read_avatar() uses os.path.abspath() and startswith check at lines 45-47\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET%20%2Fnote::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /note\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /note\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"get_note() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: get_note() uses parameterized query at line 28 with both id and owner\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"GET%20%2Fsearch::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"GET /search\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"GET /search\",\n \"boundary\": \"user->database\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"injection-sql\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"search_notes() uses parameterized query with ? placeholders\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed string interpolation at line 22 allows SQL injection\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"POST%20%2Fdelete::user-A-%3Euser-B-data::notes-api::idor\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"POST /delete\",\n \"boundary\": \"user-A->user-B-data\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"idor\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"POST /delete\",\n \"boundary\": \"user-A->user-B-data\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"idor\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"candidate\",\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-3\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"verifier-3\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"delete_note() verifies note ownership before deletion\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"FAIL: Confirmed missing ownership check allows cross-user note deletion\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [\n \"idor-delete-endpoint\"\n ],\n \"unresolved\": []\n },\n {\n \"coverage_id\": \"all%20endpoints::unauthenticated-%3Eauthenticated::notes-api::auth-bypass\",\n \"canonical_refs\": {\n \"surface\": \"all endpoints\",\n \"boundary\": \"unauthenticated->authenticated\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"auth-bypass\"\n },\n \"surface\": \"all endpoints\",\n \"boundary\": \"unauthenticated->authenticated\",\n \"subsystem\": \"notes-api\",\n \"attack_class\": \"auth-bypass\",\n \"starting_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"ordinary_attack_class_block\": null,\n \"selected_companion_blocks\": [],\n \"excluded_blocks\": [],\n \"prior_status\": \"none\",\n \"attempts\": [],\n \"wave\": 1,\n \"status\": \"covered\",\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"local_checks\": [\n {\n \"agent_id\": \"hunter-1\",\n \"reviewed_paths\": [\n \"app/server.py\"\n ],\n \"invariant\": \"All endpoints require valid X-Session header\",\n \"method\": \"source\",\n \"result\": \"PASS: current_user() check at lines 63-64, 78-80 returns 401 for missing/invalid session\",\n \"artifact\": null\n }\n ],\n \"result_fingerprints\": [],\n \"unresolved\": []\n }\n]"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","exists":true,"truncated":false},"title":"../home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","time":{"start":1793149507459,"end":1793149507480}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"The coverage ledger format is quite strict. Let me fix the issues:\n1. coverage_id must be the canonical ID derived from canonical_refs (URL encoded)\n2. archived attempts must have wave < current wave\n3. reassignment_reason must be visible text (non-empty)\n4. units must be sorted lexicographically by coverage_id\n5. For covered units, agent_id must be fresh (different from archived attempts)\n6. local_checks agent_ids must not reuse archived attempt owners\n\nLet me rewrite the coverage ledger properly. The canonicalCoverageId function encodes the fields with URL encoding. Let me compute the correct coverage_ids:\n\n1. GET /search -> \"GET%20%2Fsearch::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\n2. GET /attachment -> \"GET%20%2Fattachment::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\n3. POST /delete -> \"POST%20%2Fdelete::user-A-%3Euser-B-data::notes-api::idor\"\n4. GET /note -> \"GET%20%2Fnote::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\n5. GET /avatar -> \"GET%20%2Favatar::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\n6. all endpoints -> \"all%20endpoints::unauthenticated-%3Eauthenticated::notes-api::auth-bypass\"\n\nAnd they must be sorted lexicographically. Let me order them:\n- \"GET%20%2Fattachment::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\n- \"GET%20%2Fnote::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\n- \"GET%20%2Fsearch::user-%3Edatabase::notes-api::injection-sql\"\n- \"POST%20%2Fdelete::user-A-%3Euser-B-data::notes-api::idor\"\n- \"all%20endpoints::unauthenticated-%3Eauthenticated::notes-api::auth-bypass\"\n- \"GET%20%2Favatar::user-%3Efilesystem::notes-api::path-traversal\"\n\nWait, \"all endpoints\" starts with \"all\" which comes before \"GET\". Let me check the actual lexicographic order of the canonical IDs.\n\nActually, looking at the encodeCanonicalRef function, it encodes spaces as %20, / as %2F, > as %3E, etc. So the lexicographic order would be based on the encoded strings.\n\nLet me just create the proper coverage ledger with correct canonical IDs, proper wave numbers (archived attempts should have wave < current wave, so wave 0 for archived or no archived attempts for wave 1), and fresh agent IDs.\n\nFor a quick profile with only 1 wave, I think the current wave is 1, and archived attempts would be from prior waves (wave 0). But since this is the first run, there are no prior waves. Let me not include attempts array for the initial wave, or include empty attempts.\n\nActually, looking at the validation, the attempts array is for archived attempts from prior waves. For the current wave, the unit's status, agent_id, reviewed_paths, local_checks, etc. represent the current attempt. The attempts array should contain only prior wave attempts.\n\nSince this is wave 1 and there are no prior waves, the attempts array should be empty. Let me also make sure the status is correct:\n- For findings (candidates), status should be \"candidate\"\n- For covered (no findings), status should be \"covered\"\n\nAlso, for candidate units, the current agent_id must be fresh (not in prior attempts), and local_checks agent_ids must also be fresh.\n\nLet me rewrite the coverage ledger properly.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800a177a001bL7PJJqYsy7PJK","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_180098ac50016MlcG9DEc7eBbg"}}
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{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1793149511431,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"id":"prt_1800a2703001c4ANUe9cvJ0TJf","messageID":"msg_1800a183e001Sa8jYcJr65THoC","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","snapshot":"6a62eda91a74991a8b21bb65a3cd442946f16fb8","type":"step-start"}}
{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149548264,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call-7ee0e793-44a8-42e3-a441-36522bbfa4c8","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"node /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/home/security-audit-skill/notes/run-1/coverage-ledger.json","description":"Validate coverage ledger"},"output":"PASS: 6 coverage units valid\n","metadata":{"output":"PASS: 6 coverage units valid\n","exit":0,"description":"Validate coverage ledger","truncated":false},"title":"Validate coverage ledger","time":{"start":1793149548256,"end":1793149548262}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Now let me validate the coverage ledger again.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800ab666001725ourV2wKHOZG","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_1800a183e001Sa8jYcJr65THoC"}}
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{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1793149570006,"sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"task","callID":"call-14bb630e-e599-482d-b5b9-6b160ebdab71","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"description":"Final verification of SQL injection finding","prompt":"You are an independent final verifier for the SQL injection finding in the notes service.\n\nFinding: sql-injection-search-endpoint\nSource: app/server.py lines 20-23, 65-66\n\nYour task: Re-verify this finding independently. Check the source code directly and confirm:\n1. The vulnerability exists as described\n2. The evidence is accurate\n3. The severity assessment is correct\n4. The fix is appropriate\n\nRead the current source code at /workspace/triedagents-tools/runs/2026-10-28/tools/security-audit-skill/proj/app/server.py and confirm the finding.\n\nReturn JSON:\n{\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"verified\": true/false,\n \"corrections\": [],\n \"notes\": \"any observations\"\n}","subagent_type":"explore"},"output":"task_id: ses_e7ff52852ffeHe5GTinsr3aT5y (for resuming to continue this task if needed)\n\n\n{\n \"fingerprint\": \"sql-injection-search-endpoint\",\n \"verified\": true,\n \"corrections\": [],\n \"notes\": \"Confirmed SQL injection vulnerability in search_notes function (lines 20-23). The term parameter is directly interpolated into the SQL query using string formatting (%s) instead of parameterized queries. The /search endpoint (line 66) passes user-controlled 'q' parameter directly to this function without sanitization. This is a critical severity vulnerability allowing arbitrary SQL execution. The fix should use parameterized queries like get_note() does on lines 27-29 (using ? placeholders).\"\n}\n","metadata":{"sessionId":"ses_e7ff52852ffeHe5GTinsr3aT5y","model":{"modelID":"nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free","providerID":"openrouter"},"truncated":false},"title":"Final verification of SQL injection finding","time":{"start":1793149556665,"end":1793149570004}},"metadata":{"openrouter":{"reasoning_details":[{"type":"reasoning.text","text":"Both findings.json and coverage-ledger.json are now valid. Now I need to run the independent record verification phase (Phase 5) and then generate the final report (Phase 6).\n\nFor Phase 5 (Independent record verification), I need to use fresh agents to verify the final source claims. Let me run verifiers for each of the 3 confirmed findings to reconfirm them.\n\nActually, looking at the quick profile requirements: \"use one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification.\" I already did the candidate validation with verifier-1, verifier-2, verifier-3. Now I need to do final record verification with fresh agents.\n\nLet me launch 3 fresh verifiers for the final verification.","format":"unknown","index":0}]}},"id":"prt_1800ad7a8001oIHvyiHHd6Wftv","sessionID":"ses_e7fffb3efffeYXR45XlDMBmnPL","messageID":"msg_1800ab7010010BHkfuvAytelT3"}}
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Terminated
exit=143 end 09:10:15
killed by us at 09:10:17 after free-models-per-day 429 (first 429 at 09:06:16 UTC+8)